Thai Regime Collapses – Preparing for the Fallout

His term in office, stretching from 2001-2006, also included mass murder in 2003 and 2004 that would leave nearly 3,000 dead, and systematic violence aimed at his political opponents including up to 18 human rights activists who were either assassinated or disappeared.

By 2006, his attempts to remove Thailand’s sociopolitical checks-and-balances, his systematic abuse of power, attempts to subvert Thai sovereignty on behalf of foreign interests, and increasing contention between him and Thailand’s various national institutions, including the courts and military, led to a bloodless coup that finally ousted him from power. Following the coup, a year-long reformation of Thailand’s political institutions would lay the groundwork to being uprooting Shinawatra’s extensively dug-in political machine.

Following reforms, elections were held and as expected, Shinawatra’s political machine found itself back in power. Two successive regimes led by Samak Sundaravej – Shinawatra’s admitted proxy candidate – and Somchai Wongsawat – Shinawatra’s brother-in-law – would likewise be ousted through a series of street demonstrations and court decisions. By 2008 Democrat Party candidate Abhisit Vejjajiva would become Thailand’s prime minister and would face violent street protests organized by Shinawatra in both 2009 and 2010.

To avoid further violence, early general elections were held in 2011, and once again Shinawatra’s political machine found itself in power. Performance at the polls, however, showed a weakening across his support base. Shinawatra, living in self-imposed exile primarily in Dubai, United Arab Emirates to evade a two-year jail sentence, multiple arrest warrants, and a long list of pending legal cases, nominated his own sister, Yingluck Shinawatra to take his place.

What is expected in the following days and weeks to come is a systematic campaign of terrorism and attempts to mobilize pro-regime “red shirt” mobs as a show of support for Shinawatra and dissatisfaction over the court’s ruling. The West, eager to keep Shinawatra in power in Thailand, while it builds a united front across Southeast Asia to hem in China, will undoubtedly attempt to bolster these attempts with editorial columns and news reports favorable to the regime and its mobs – however violent or minuscule they may be.

Thus far Thailand’s military has remained in the background, realizing that any overt move would only justify Shinawatra’s notoriously violent tactics. The military is likely to continue this posture while allowing the regime to further incriminate itself before a growing opposition in Thailand, and an increasingly aware and astute audience abroad. The court ruling in response to what is clear-cut nepotism and abuse of power will be difficult for the Western media to spin, and will most likely result in a narrative gravitating toward how the “electorate” should decide the fate of the regime, not the courts.

Unfortunately for the West and their proxy regime in Thailand, the electorate has already decided. In February this year, over half of Thailand’s eligible voters outright boycotted the elections organized by the regime. Additionally, Thailand’s main opposition party chose not to run. Many of those that did vote, defaced their ballots or marked “no vote” in protest. What is left of the regime is a dwindling number of fanatics known as “red shirts,” who have attempted and failed to organize counter-rallies to match protracted anti-regime protests across the country. There are also militants and politically-motivated police.
The final option for the regime appears to be violence. Already, dozens of men, women, and children have been killed as pro-regime militants have attacked protests across the country. These included attacks with hand grenades, 40mm M79 grenade launchers, and an assortment of military assault weapons. The regime has been openly training what it calls a “Volunteers’ Ward to Protect the Country’s Democracy,” and is little more than the recruitment of militants to take part in violence it has repeatedly insisted will unfold should the courts rule against them.

The regime and its Western sponsors have repeatedly floated the threat that Thailand teeters at the edge of civil war. Statistics, demographics, and the strategic lay of Thailand, however, makes this impossible. In 2010, when Shinawatra’s political machine enjoyed much more prominence, only 7% of Thailand’s population identified themselves as “red.” This number has only dwindled further. Conversely, in 2010, the Thai military enjoyed widespread popularity and was seen as an important independent institution within Thailand’s political landscape. This image has only improved due to their response during catastrophic floods in 2011, and their hands-off approach to the current political situation.