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Amir Rapaport: Ever-changing Middle East and challenges facing Israeli
The Middle East Continues to Change
Amir Rapaport in a column on the ever-changing Middle East and the =
challenges facing the Israeli defense establishment
Amir Rapaport 21/2/2014
http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=3D483&ArticleID=3D2756
Regional Status Picture: A regional status picture derived from the =
situation appraisal of the Israeli defense community for early 2014:
+ Syria is still disintegrating
+ Lebanon is on the way to a civil war and disintegration
+ Iraq is already disintegrated
+ Egypt is coming to its senses and the Egyptian Army consolidates its hold =
vis-=E0-vis the World Jihad elements in the Sinai and presses on with its =
struggle against Hamas in Gaza.
+ Jordan is very stable
+ Hamas rules the Gaza Strip (almost) unchecked
+ Palestinian Authority in the Judea and Samaria region: The level of =
violence there depends on the progress of the political negotiations (also).
Let=92s begin with Syria: the first ships carrying Syrian chemical weapons =
have sailed recently, but it is still uncertain whether Assad will try to =
conceal some of the inventories he possesses. The agreement with the USA =
regarding the disarmament of chemical weapons has provided the Assad regime =
with an insurance policy of sorts, but contrary to the impression one may =
get from the world press, Assad is still far from deciding the outcome of =
the civil war in Syria. On the contrary, Assad continues to lose ground and =
call in Hezbollah reinforcements from Lebanon to assist him in the primary =
battles. The battles in Syria currently concentrate on the attempt by Assad=
=92s =
military to establish territorial continuity between Damascus (parts of =
which have been captured by rebel forces) and the Alawi-dominated areas in =
north-eastern Syria. The areas bordering with Israel, on the Golan Heights, =
are mostly dominated by rebels of various factions, including World Jihad =
men who dominate the southern part of the Syrian Golan Heights.
The Syrian civil war is rapidly drifting into Lebanon. Car bombs and even =
rocket attacks against the Dahiya quarter, the Hezbollah stronghold in =
Beirut, are directly associated with Hassan Nasrallah=92s support of Bashar =
Al-Assad. As far as Israel is concerned, these are not foreign news: the wa=
r =
in Lebanon is drifting into Israeli territory, too. For example, the rocket =
attack from Lebanon into Israel in December 2013 was carried out by a Jihad =
organization that attempted to provoke Israel into a confrontation with =
Hezbollah =96 a case of upside-down thinking. What about the Judea and Sama=
ria =
region? The average level of violent activities is crawling upward, but the =
real test will take place in the spring, when the nine months allotted to =
the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians come to an end. Will =
the negotiations be extended or will they be interrupted?
In Israel and in the Palestinian Authority they have been busy recently =
consolidating their respective responses to the suggestions made by US =
Secretary of State John Kerry during his recent visits to the region. The =
Israeli defense community has already rejected the American suggestion to =
settle for Israeli presence at the border crossings in the Jordan Valley an=
d =
rely on satellite and ground surveillance technology that would replace the =
physical presence on the ground. Israel=92s previous defense minister, Ehud =
Barak, was willing to =93consider=94 such ideas. The present Minister, Mosh=
e =
(=93Bogie=94) Yaalon, has bluntly declined.
The Jihad Era: The elements responsible for most of the fire incidents in =
late 2013 and early 2014 (rockets attacks from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip =
against Israel, as well as the attacks along the borders with Syria and =
Lebanon) were organizations calling themselves =91Salafist=92 organizations=
. The =
Salafists are the most extreme of extremist Muslims. They totally reject =
progress and aspire to return to the days of the great Islamic Caliphate =
that existed after the age of Muhammad the Prophet. They advocate Jihad war =
against all infidels =96 Jews, Christians and even Muslims who do not follo=
w =
the teachings of their sect.
In the age of new terrorism and Jihad, orders and instructions are not =
issued by speech but through the Internet. There is no structured chain of =
command, the very last activist can establish direct contact with the senio=
r =
leaders of Al-Qaeda (all under assumed names, naturally), on Facebook or =
through WhatsApp. The social networks convey millions of messages every day=
, =
and finding the ones that can alert of possible terrorist preparations is a =
highly complex undertaking. Nevertheless, the intelligence agencies and =
systems manage to obtain high-quality information even from those networks.
According to Israeli estimates, in early 2014 the military regime in Egypt =
is gaining momentum in its war against the Jihad organizations. The =
Jihadists in the Sinai Peninsula still impose a major threat as far as =
Israel is concerned, especially on air traffic in and out of the town of =
Eilat. This is the reason why the Israel Security Agency (Shabak) ordered, =
a =
few months ago, that the flight corridors leading to the town be changed so =
as to reposition them as far away as possible from the unruly territory of =
the Sinai. However, the big picture shows that the Jihadists are being =
pushed out of the Sinai and that they are shedding blood in their =
confrontations with the Egyptian Army. Occasionally, they succeed in =
releasing pressure or sending some sort of =93signal=94 in the form of rock=
ets =
fired at Eilat. These attacks are, in fact, intended to undermine the =
relations between Israel and Egypt.
The most severe blow, as far as Hamas in Gaza is concerned, has been the =
fact that in the context of their confrontation with the Salafists, the =
Egyptian forces had almost completely =93dried out=94 the underground tunne=
ls =
that enabled free movement of terrorists as well as the smuggling of arms =
and goods to and from the Sinai =96 to and from the Gaza Strip. This blow h=
as =
had both economic and operational implications: since Operation Pillar of =
Defense (November 2012), Hamas has not been able to renew the smuggling of =
missiles from Libya or Iran through the Sinai, and is now dependent entirel=
y =
on its own manufacturing potential (they are already capable of =
manufacturing missiles with a range that extends to Tel-Aviv, and unmanned =
airborne vehicles).
Nevertheless, Hamas continues to prepare for the next significant round of =
hostilities against Israel, and those preparations include the subterranean =
medium =96 the tunnels Hamas excavates under the fence separating between t=
he =
Strip and Israel could provide the infrastructure for the next kidnapping =
attack, which would ignite the next confrontation.
Iran: Despite the warming relations between Iran and the West, as reflected =
at the Davos conference in early 2014, Israel still regards Iran as the No.=
1 =
danger in the coming year as well.
According to the Israeli perception, Iran is fooling the entire world and =
will continue to strive for the Bomb clandestinely after the sanctions that =
had been imposed on it have been dramatically reduced.
But has the option of an Israeli attack against Iran been taken off the =
table? Absolutely not! It may not be relevant only during the first few =
months of the implementation of the interim agreement with Iran, which came =
into effect on January 20, 2014. Israel will attempt to collect intelligenc=
e =
that would prove that Iran continues to strive for the Bomb, the agreement =
with the West notwithstanding, and if evidence to that effect is obtained =
=96 =
Israel may surprise the world by staging an offensive strike against Iran=
=92s =
nuclear installations, some time during the later half of this year.
Of all things, it is prevailing sense in Jerusalem that the USA is willing =
to reach an agreement with the Iranians at almost any price which could pus=
h =
Israel to stage the attack on its own.
Meanwhile, Back at the Mossad: The fact that as far as Israel is concerned =
Iran continues to fool the entire world and that it is getting closer to th=
e =
first bomb could also be regarded as a failure of sorts of the Israeli =
Mossad, whose highest priority mission of the last decade was to delay the =
Iranian nuclear project (a mission which has thus far been executed with a =
fair degree of success, through an extensive range of forestallment =
operations, as reported by foreign sources around the globe).
The atmosphere around this agency is not a comfortable one these days. The =
Mossad has undergone an organizational upheaval in recent years. Pursuant t=
o =
the retirement of former Mossad chief Meir Dagan, not less than three =
division heads left the organization as well, including the heads of two of =
the primary divisions, Tevel and Caesarea. The transition of Yossi Cohen, =
formerly the deputy chief of Mossad, to the position of Chairman of the =
National Security Council two months ago has also generated some shockwaves =
in the agency. Above all, the agency is currently undergoing yet another =
structural change, led by Mossad chief Tamir Pardo. In the context of this =
change, the agency=92s staff is being reinforced and responsibilities that =
were once the exclusive domain of the operational divisions are being =
assigned to it. This change, too, is not going down without internal =
opposition =96 and that=92s putting it mildly.
=94Te=92uzah=94: The IDF was unable to begin the year 2014 with a multi-yea=
r plan =
approved by the political echelon.
The original plan, Te=92uzah (=93valor=94) had to undergo revisions pursuan=
t to =
the allegedly final government decision regarding the final defense budget =
for 2014.
IDF may submit the Te=92uzah plan to the government for final approval in t=
he =
coming weeks, where its implications would be explained. Concerns in the ID=
F =
do not run very high =96 it is fairly clear that after all of the =
presentations and graph and figure-laden transparencies have been presented =
(the number of tanks, for example, is currently being reduced to the number =
the IDF had on the eve of the Yom-Kippur War, owing to the budget cuts and =
also because of the changing priorities of the IDF), the defense budget wil=
l =
be increased further, post factum, even if it remains curtailed when =
compared to the budgets of previous years.
Defense Industries: The cuts in the defense budgets, in Israel and in the =
West, present a major challenge to the Israeli defense industries. In =
addition to the cuts, the fact that the largest market of the Israeli =
defense industries =96 India =96 is in a state of near-standstill owing to =
the =
elections being held in the subcontinent, is very problematic indeed. If yo=
u =
add to it the lenient export permit policy recently applied in the USA and =
Europe (including Germany, which is becoming a world leader in defense =
exports) and the =93hunger=94 of western industries for clients in the mark=
ets =
where the Israeli industry is regarded as firmly established =96 then the =
challenge will become even more acute.
At the bottom line, the Israeli defense industries are preparing for a =
certain decrease in new orders over the course of 2014, compared to previou=
s =
years that were peak years for Israeli defense exports. Nevertheless, the =
Israeli defense industries start off the new year by massively participatin=
g =
in the giant exhibitions to be held in New-Delhi and in Singapore during th=
e =
first and second weeks of February.
The excellent reputation of the Israeli defense industries may enable them =
to successfully negotiate the year 2014, which is going to be a tough year =
for everyone.
________________________________________
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What a complete load of fookin gobbledygook