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The New Contacts between Egypt and Russia: How Far Will They Go?
The New Contacts between Egypt and Russia: How Far Will They Go?
INSS Insight No. 522, February 27, 2014
Ephraim Kam, Zvi Magen .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=3D4538&articleid=3D6685
SUMMARY: In recent months there has been a significant, even unprecedented =
rise in contacts between Russia and the new government in Egypt. The main =
topic discussed in these talks is increasing bilateral military cooperation=
. =
According to many reports, a large arms deal, to the tune of $2-3 billion, =
was discussed, and possibly even reached. If the talks between Egypt and =
Russia lead to a significant arms deal, this would represent an important =
change in Egyptian policy. A decision by the current Egyptian government =
several months after it came to power to sign a large arms deal with Russia =
implies that it is prepared to change, even to a limited extent, the balanc=
e =
of its relations with the two large powers.
.
In recent months there has been a significant, even unprecedented increase =
in contacts between Russia and the new government in Egypt. In October 2013=
, =
the head of Russian military intelligence visited Cairo. In November, Russi=
a=92s =
defense minister and foreign minister visited Egypt together, the first tim=
e =
a joint visit of this sort took place since the early 1970s. This month, =
Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt=92s defense minister and the strongman of the =
regime, visited Moscow with Foreign Minister Nabil al-Fahmy and a high leve=
l =
military delegation. Since this visit, there is talk of a subsequent high =
level meeting between the sides, to take place in late March, and media =
reports have speculated that Russia=92s President Putin will visit Egypt.
The main topic discussed in these talks is increasing bilateral military =
cooperation. According to many reports, a large arms deal, to the tune of =
$2-3 billion, was discussed, and possibly even reached. The deal apparently =
includes two MiG-29 squadrons, Mi-35 helicopters, air defense systems, =
coastal anti-ship missiles, and advanced anti-tank weapons; funding would =
likely come from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While no =
announcement about the deal was issued at the end of the visit to Moscow by =
the Egyptian ministers, an agreement, though not yet signed, was reportedly =
outlined, and may be finalized in another meeting between the two =
governments in late March.
It has been reported that as part of the Egyptian-Russian cooperation, Egyp=
t =
will supply Russia with naval services at the port of Alexandria. If the =
Assad regime falls, this could be a substitute for Russian naval services a=
t =
the port of Tartus in Syria. The expanded ties could also include =
cooperation in counterterrorism activity, joint military exercises and =
technical cooperation, and renovation of the electrical system at the Aswan =
dam.
The intensity of the talks between Egypt and Russia is undoubtedly linked t=
o =
the tension in recent months between Egypt and the United States. There is =
growing anger in Egypt at the Obama administration=92s public criticism of =
the =
overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood government and the use of force against =
Muslim Brotherhood activists by security forces. The position of the US =
administration has given Egypt=92s top leadership the feeling that the =
administration does not understand Egypt=92s problems, that it is prepared =
to =
support the Muslim Brotherhood regime only because it came to power in =
democratic elections, and that it is exploiting Cairo=92s need for US aid i=
n =
order to intervene in Egypt=92s internal affairs.
Particularly anger was aroused by the US administration=92s decision to =
suspend part of the military aid to Egypt, especially at a time when the =
government is fighting to stem the wave of terrorist attacks and impose law =
and order. The administration=92s decision was a compromise between those, =
including in Congress, who demanded that military aid to Egypt be suspended=
, =
and those who warned against measures that would harm US interests, =
including the peaceful relations between Egypt and Israel. Thus, the =
administration decided to freeze $250 million dollars of the military aid t=
o =
Egypt, and to delay the planned shipments of several F-16s, Apache =
helicopters, anti-ship missiles, and spare tank parts, in accordance with a =
ban on providing aid to a country whose leader was ousted in a military =
coup.
If the talks between Egypt and Russia lead to a significant arms deal, this =
would represent an important change in Egyptian policy. In 1974, after Egyp=
t =
switched from a pro-Soviet orientation to political, military, and economic =
dependence on the United States, the Soviet Union stopped supplying Egypt =
with weapons. A decision by the current Egyptian government several months =
after it came to power to sign a large arms deal with Russia implies that i=
t =
is prepared to change, even to a limited extent, the balance of its =
relations with the two large powers and cease its exclusive reliance on the =
supply of Western weaponry.
From the reports received thus far, Egypt and Russia have likely discussed =
such a deal – otherwise it would difficult to explain why the defense =
ministers and military delegations from both countries participated in the =
talks. It is also clear that Russia is eager to realize this deal, which =
would be a significant achievement, both because it would bring Russia back =
into the Egyptian arms market and because it would signal to the Arab state=
s =
that rely on Western arms that an arms deal with Russia is eminently =
possible. Therefore, the deal could serve as a lever for a renewed expansio=
n =
of Russia=92s influence in the Arab world, as occurred in the mid-1950s.
Beyond Russia=92s clear interest in expanding defense exports to the Middle =
East, the leading Russian consideration in renewing the dialogue with Egypt =
and other countries in the region is political-strategic. With the Arab =
Spring, Russia, under pressure from the Western-backed Sunni camp, was =
forced to withdraw from the regional prominence that it had attained with =
great effort. Other than Iran, Russian influence has been limited to Syria, =
and therefore Russia has been competing for a significant role in the Middl=
e =
East. From Russia=92s perspective, renewing the dialogue with other countri=
es =
in the region is an especially positive opportunity that should be exploite=
d =
to shore up its standing in the region and promote its advantages over the =
West in the global friction. This opportunity was created by the change in =
policy of a number of countries that feel challenged by US policy. In =
addition to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq are engaged in new =
dialogues with Russia on issues of defense procurement and political =
cooperation.
The Egyptian regime=92s position on the deal is less clear and will probabl=
y =
depend on three constraints. The first is that since the 1980s, Egypt has =
had close military relations with the United States, which include not only =
an extensive supply of weapons, but also instruction in American combat =
doctrine, training for Egyptian officers, joint exercises, and personal =
relations between officers from both militaries. While the Egyptian militar=
y =
still has weapon systems that date from its ties with the Soviet Union, =
these are at least forty years old and as such obsolete, and the current =
generation of Egyptian officers has no other connection to the Russian =
military. Therefore, it would not be simple to reintroduce Russian weapons =
on a significant scale.
The second constraint is financial. American weapons are supplied to Egypt =
as part of the aid package. Russia would presumably not supply these weapon=
s =
as part of an aid package, but Egypt does not have the ability – certainly =
given its current economic situation – to fund such a deal by itself. It is =
an open question whether Saudi Arabia and the UAE have an interest in =
funding the deal.
The third and most important constraint concerns the US, which has yet to =
comment publicly on the reported deal. However, the administration would =
likely view such a deal with great dissatisfaction because an unprecedented =
arms deal with Russia by a major US ally would represent further American =
weakness in the region and constitute an achievement for Russia. There have =
reportedly been dozens of telephone calls in recent months between US =
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and his Egyptian counterpart, and Secretar=
y =
of State Kerry visited Cairo in November 2013. The United States has =
presumably pressured Egypt not to sign the deal. Egypt, therefore, must tak=
e =
into account that signing the deal would incur a negative response from the =
United States and damage the bilateral relations, including the significant =
economic and military assistance.
It is still not clear whether a deal will be concluded. Egypt may be =
deterred from signing it because of these constraints, or it might limit it =
to an insignificant deal and make do with expressing dissatisfaction with =
the US administration=92s posture toward it in recent months. But even if t=
he =
Egyptian regime does sign the deal, it will presumably continue to view the =
United States as its main strategic partner in the region, with no =
substitute available. Thus, it will likely seek to expand its ability to =
maneuver vis-=E0-vis the United States and make it clear that it is not =
prepared to accept American intervention in Egypt=92s internal affairs. =
________________________________________
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