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IDF Chief Armor Officer: Ground Maneuver Will Always Be Necessary
“Ground Maneuver Will Always Be Necessary”
The reform in the IDF Armored Corps is taking shape. The IDF Chief Armor =
Officer, Brig. Gen. Shmuel Olansky, in an exclusive interview with Israel =
Defense
Or Heller 2/3/2014
http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=3D483&ArticleID=3D2781
Brig. Gen. Shmuel Olansky Brig. Gen. Shmuel Olansky I am not sure where I =
would rather be with all of the threats we face today,” begins the IDF Chie=
f =
Armor Officer, Brig. Gen. Shmuel Olansky. “On foot behind a rock, or inside =
the Merkava Mark-IV tank fitted with the Aspro-A/Trophy system or on board =
the APC moving alongside that Merkava tank.”
In view of the realization that wars have changed and reality has changed, =
the IDF Armored Corps is changing as well. Brig. Gen. Olansky is very clear =
and confident about the principles of the reform he is currently leading. =
“Alongside the tanks, which lead the battalion combat effort, we want to =
prepare the combat task force for the challenges facing it by empowering th=
e =
armored/mechanized infantry within the armored (tank) battalions. In each =
armored battalion, we are assembling a combat support company that includes =
a mortar platoon, a surveillance element capable of call
ing in and directing fire support, and a reconnaissance platoon. All of =
these elements, along with the tanks that will continue to lead the =
maneuver, will make up a battalion-size combat task force that is relevant =
to today’s battlefield. We have here a new world of content in the Armored =
Corps =96 combat reconnaissance.”
What is the timetable for the implementation of the new plan?
“We intend to recruit the first company out of the November 2013 recruitmen=
t =
class. These recruits will take the complete training course, thirty weeks =
at the IDF Armored Corps School, where they will learn the Armored Corps =
occupational skill and then be divided into their respective specialized =
skills: scout, mortar operator and observer/surveillance operator. The =
graduates will make up the combat support companies within the armored =
battalions. We are currently reorganizing the entire tank OrBat of the IDF.”
Will you be making adjustments in the Armored Corps training courses and =
seminars?
“Certainly. I am currently assembling armored/mechanized infantry companies =
just like those of the infantry brigades, possessing the same capabilities =
with the exception of extended operations on foot, as they will operate nea=
r =
the tanks. We have an opportunity here to empower the remaining elements. =
Today’s armored/mechanized infantry warfighter looks exactly the same as an =
infantry warfighter, with the exception of the purpose-specific weapons, =
which they do not need.”
The Aspro-A/Trophy system has, until now, operated effectively on the Gaza =
line in isolated and rare incidents of antitank fire. But how would this =
system operate during the third Lebanon war opposite a rainstorm of antitan=
k =
missiles fired at each tank?
“That’s just it. This system is excellent. The technology was considered =
fictional ten years ago. I suggest we refrain from terrorizing ourselves. =
Antitank fire does not come as a rainstorm. Even in antitank-saturated =
scenarios we have a range of capabilities for coping with the threats. As =
our maneuver becomes more substantial, the capabilities of the =
Aspro-A/Trophy system will come more significantly into play. Additionally, =
our range of capabilities will include a surveillance capability =96 for =
spotting the antitank threats; our surveillance elements will be able to =
call in and direct the fire of Keshet 120mm mortars; our reconnaissance =
platoon will possess the ability to recognize the antitank threats in =
advance, and our tanks will possess the ability of firing a round at the =
threat.”
“Do Not Mourn the Syrian Army”
What do we know about the state of the Syrian armor after more than two and =
a half years of a bloody civil war? Is it still a significant player?
“Firstly, we know that it is much better trained now, as it has been =
fighting. It brushes with the opposition forces in the context of the civil =
war. At the same time, they have also experienced wear as a result of the =
on-going fighting, but it still exists. I do not know how many tanks the =
Syrian Army has lost in the civil war, they have been fighting for two and =
a =
half years. On the other hand you realize that people who fight become more =
proficient and stronger. The Syrian armor is definitely a significant playe=
r =
in the Middle East. I would not hasten to mourn the armored divisions and =
the land maneuvering capability of the Syrian Army.”
But even in your presentations you focus on the fact that the fighting has =
shifted from the front line into the depth of the territory, namely =96 a w=
ar =
of rockets and missiles against the Israeli rear area, so how does the =
Armored Corps fit in?
“Even before the civil war in Syria broke out, we had observed those trends =
in the Syrian Army. The Syrian Army disbanded armored units and established =
commando units instead. They acquired antitank systems and demolition =
capabilities. The Syrians developed a substantial rocket layout. These were =
not just the trends within the paramilitary organizations. We observed the =
same trends in the Syrian Army, too. At the same time, they still have =
armored divisions and tank brigades that use T-72 tanks. They are there, an=
d =
they are well-trained.”
How would an encounter between a T-72 tank and a Merkava Mark-IV tank look =
in 2013? Is there any chance here for a fair fight?
“There is no fair fight here. The Merkava Mark-IV tank is a true =
masterpiece. It possesses capabilities that are superior to those of any =
other tank worldwide, and no one even comes close. This applies to crew =
protection, to trafficability and to fire control. In some aspects it is =
‘only’ in first place. With regard to most aspects, however, it is far =
beyond anything else out there.”
If the third Lebanon war should break out tomorrow morning, in what way wil=
l =
the maneuver executed by the Armored Corps be different in view of the =
lessons derived from the summer of 2006?
“The maneuver will be much stronger and faster, with a complete envelope of =
structured and precise intelligence gathering and fire employment =
activities. We will see combined operations of tanks with infantry and =
assault engineering elements, but a maneuver is still a maneuver. Its =
objective is to transfer strength from the contact line deep into the enemy =
territory. Just like in all of the wars that we had, that is what we will =
see in our future wars =96 a battalion-size combat task force with massive =
strength and firepower, which protects itself and reaches the point where =
its strength is utilized to maximum benefit =96 through firepower, through =
its =
scoring capabilities. In view of the threats we face today, I believe =
there’s no escaping the need to maintain a strong and fully-prepared ground =
layout and to employ it when necessary in order to bring the campaign to an =
end as soon as possible.
“We would not be able, opposite Lebanon, to maintain a campaign of wearing =
out the opponent through the use of fire, like we did in Operation Pillar o=
f =
Defense, for instance. Many people say ‘here, we saw during Operation Pilla=
r =
of Defense that a maneuver is no longer necessary.’ But in Operation Pillar =
of Defense, the very fact that the maneuver was poised and ready to launch =
cut the duration of the fighting short. Secondly, Lebanon and Syria are not =
the same as the Hamas in Gaza. They will not be influenced by strategic =
players (like Egypt) as Hamas was. In Lebanon and Syria, if we want to brin=
g =
about a prompt conclusion of the campaign, we will have no other choice but =
to maneuver into the enemy’s centers of gravity, and the armored forces wil=
l =
execute and lead that maneuver, as they know how to do it quickly and =
forcefully.”
How will a task force maneuver if it is made up, theoretically, of Merkava =
Mark-IV tanks fitted with the Aspro-A/Trophy antitank missile interception =
system on the one hand, while the infantry elements still ride in the =
outdated and vulnerable M113 APCs?
“I think that if you examine the land solution, you will realize that it is =
a good solution. Would I prefer something better? Of course I would. We do =
not live in a bubble and we realize that the defense budget is a derivative =
of the economic situation. It is a restriction that applies to us which I =
cannot ignore. Where I would have liked to invest the extra money is a =
question I ponder all the time. I think that as long as the M113 APC =
operates in the environment of a complete battalion system, I will have no =
doubts about committing to battle the battalion combat task force and all =
elements thereof.”
What was your contribution as Chief Armor Officer to the staff work ordered =
by the decision of the Chief of Staff to disband six tank brigades using th=
e =
old ‘Patton’ tanks?
“We are disbanding layouts that are outdated layouts that had reached the =
end of the road. The logic here is both conceptual and operational. It is =
not that we had called out a random number and then went on to look for wha=
t =
we could disband. Obviously, we would prefer that instead of the brigades w=
e =
disband ten more Merkava Mark-IV brigades would have been established, but =
we live in a certain reality that we cannot ignore. The people at IDF GHQ =
sat down and thought and conducted discussions and carried out simulations =
and examinations, but eventually you realize that some layouts had reached =
the end of the road, like the ‘Patton’ and Merkava Mark-I tanks. But let’s =
talk about the bright side =96 next year, the IDF 7th Armored Brigade will =
be =
converted to a Merkava Mark-IV brigade!”
Still, when there are voices at IDF GHQ who speak about the end of the =
armor-versus-armor battle era, what is the future you envision for the tank =
in the IDF?
“I think that precisely at the 40th anniversary of the Yom-Kippur War, we =
realized what our forefathers had understood since the days of the Bible: =
that the land maneuver has always been and will always be necessary in orde=
r =
to gain an overbalance in a war. The armored forces will be right there at =
the head of the land maneuver, with the tanks in front, surrounded by the =
envelope. We will reach the end of the maneuver era when we have reached th=
e =
end of the era of wars. I still do not see an end to the era of wars. But i=
f =
we do not train and practice, we will be less proficient =96 it’s all very =
straightforward.”
________________________________________
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