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Gilead Sher – exchange with IMRA on Prospects for a Gaza Seaport
——– Original message ——–
From: “Dr. Aaron Lerner”
Date: 3/14/2016 01:13 (GMT+02:00)
To: Gilead Sher
Subject: “construction of the port should include some form of political
understanding between the regional parties that also includes a long term
ceasefire”
Dear Gilead Sher,
Your latest article mentions the need for effective supervision inside the
Gaza Strip.
I would like to suggest that the critical element of any arrangement is the
handling of failures in the supervision.
That is to say: when dual use material is successfully diverted for use in
weapons factories there are arrangements to destroy these weapons factories.
This. of course, would be in stark contrast to the current “quiet for quiet”
arrangement according to which Israel does not interfere with weapons
manufacturing using illegally smuggled materials once the material has been
successfully smuggled into the Gaza Strip.
Best regards,
Aaron
Dr. Aaron Lerner – www.imra.org.il
From: Gilead Sher
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2016 8:45 AM
To: Dr. Aaron Lerner ; [email protected]
Subject: RE: “construction of the port should include some form of political
understanding between the regional parties that also includes a long term
ceasefire”
Dear Aaron,
Thank you for your comment with which I entirely agree.
Best wishes,
Gilead
From: “Dr. Aaron Lerner”
Date: 3/14/2016 08:48 (GMT+02:00)
To: Gilead Sher Subject: can I share this on IMRA or just between us?Re:
“construction of the port should include some form of political
understanding between the regional parties that also includes a long term
ceasefire”
Dear Gilead,
Thanks for the reply,
Can I share this remark on IMRA or this just between us?
Thanks.
Best regards,
Aaron
From: Gilead Sher
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2016 8:55 AM
To: Dr. Aaron Lerner
Subject: RE: can I share this on IMRA or just between us?Re: “construction
of the port should include some form of political understanding between the
regional parties that also includes a long term ceasefire”
You can go ahead and share it. One of the main reasons for the deficiencies
and failures throughout the peace process has been a poor compliance with
implementation mechanisms of mutual understandings and agreements.
Gilead
====================
Prospects for a Gaza Seaport
INSS Insight No.804, March 13, 2016
Gilead Sher, Jonathan Heuberger , .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=11591
SUMMARY: In light of the growing concern that Gaza’s poor economy and high
unemployment could foment unrest and lead to renewed hostilities between
Israel and Hamas, many leading Israeli defense officials have voiced support
for a Gaza seaport, if coupled with necessary security arrangements. The
humanitarian situation is Gaza, combined with anti-Israel incitement, is a
ticking bomb directed at Israel. At the same time, Israeli security
officials understand that a Palestinian port in Gaza without adequate
security arrangements presents a major threat. Therefore, it appears that
the debate on the Gaza seaport should be guided by three main
considerations. First, the port proposals should address the Gaza population
and Hamas’s acute needs for the flow of goods and easier movement of people
to and from Gaza. Second, the port must meet Israel’s and Egypt’s security
concerns. Third, construction of the port should include some form of
political understanding between the regional parties that also includes a
long term ceasefire.
In light of the growing concern that Gaza’s poor economy and high
unemployment could foment unrest and lead to renewed hostilities between
Israel and Hamas, many leading Israeli defense officials have voiced support
for a Gaza seaport, if coupled with necessary security arrangements. So far,
the Israeli government has not endorsed such plans publicly, mindful of the
interests of Israel’s regional partners as well as security. However, two
ministers have individually supported the construction of a seaport in Gaza:
Yisrael Katz, Minister of Transportation, Intelligence, and Atomic Energy,
and Yoav Galant, Minister of Housing and Construction.
Hamas’s demand for a seaport is founded on three objectives. First, an
independent Palestinian port in Gaza, which would connect the Strip’s coast
with the outside world, would grant the Palestinians freedom of movement for
goods and people and the sense of autonomy and self-determination. Second,
it would reflect an important victory for Hamas within the Palestinian
theater and raise its status as a regional player. Finally, the port could
boost Gaza’s weak economy; indeed, Gaza never received the majority of the
billions pledged for its reconstruction, and suffers from the world’s
highest unemployment rate.
Israel has a strong interest in a long term ceasefire with Hamas, and thus
Gaza’s development is a matter of strategic value. The humanitarian
situation is Gaza, combined with anti-Israel incitement, is a ticking bomb
directed at Israel. At the same time, Israeli security officials understand
that a Palestinian port in Gaza without adequate security arrangements
presents a major threat. Through the port, Hamas could increase its arsenal
of weapons, including mid and long range missiles, air defense systems, and
guided anti-tank missiles, and become a point for entry and exit for Hamas
operatives and members of other terror organizations.
Background
The idea of constructing a seaport in Gaza was discussed at the outset of
the Oslo process, and found its way into the Declaration of Principles on
Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP) signed by Israel and the PLO in
1993. Eight months later, the Gaza-Jericho agreement spelled out these ideas
and held that plans for the construction of the port, its location, and
other related matters should be negotiated further in accordance with the
necessary security arrangements, in particular, arrangements pertaining to
the international passages that continued to be controlled by Israel. The
Interim Agreement of 1995 reiterated previous commitments.
From the outset, Israel’s security establishment has had serious
reservations regarding a Palestinian port in Gaza, fearing it could turn
into another crossing for the entry of weapons and terrorists. In the view
of the Israeli government, only the IDF could guarantee effective monitoring
of vessels and shipments entering the port. Thus, even though contracts for
the port construction were signed as early as 1994, continued disagreement
over the port’s operations and security arrangements, then planned as a PA
port under Israeli supervision, prevented its actual construction.
Eventually, plans for the seaport were stipulated in the 1999
Sharm-el-Sheikh Memorandum: construction would start right away; and
effective security and custom inspections of people and goods would be
established, along with a designated checking area. Work in fact started in
the summer of 2000 and was supposed to be completed within two years.
However, construction was halted by Israel shortly afterward, and the site
was subsequently bombed and destroyed during the second intifada. At the
outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada the donor states ceased funding the
project, and work on the port stopped. Following the ceasefire that ended
Operation Protective Edge, indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas,
via the Palestinian Authority, were supposed to take place. The port was one
of the topics for discussion.
Although Israel fully evacuated Gaza more than ten years ago, important
actors in the international community still perceive the Strip as a
territory under Israel’s responsibility. More particularly, the naval
blockade imposed on Gaza by Israel for security reasons continues to affect
Israel’s image in the world, eclipsing the fact that Israel has indeed
upheld its humanitarian commitments to the population. Therefore, Gaza’s
current situation continues to be Israel’s problem, including with regard to
the international community.
What Now?
If the Israeli government decides to engage in serious negotiations about
construction of a Gaza seaport, it will face two distinct options. The first
is to permit the construction of an actual seaport in Gaza City, whether on
its coast or off shore. The second option is to build a port for Gaza, not
in Gaza, but rather on Egyptian territory in el-Arish, or in Israel’s Ashdod
port, with distinct quays for shipments aimed for Gaza.
If the first option is implemented, Hamas could claim a political victory. A
Palestinian-run Gaza seaport would be an answer to the Hamas demand for
autonomy. The question then would be how such a plan could be reconciled
with Israel’s security needs. First, regardless of whether Hamas would
consent to any Israeli supervision of the port, it is very unlikely that
Israel would risk sending its own personnel to Gaza to check and inspect
goods and persons entering Gaza via the Mediterranean. However, if Israel or
a third party supervises the port, then this will frustrate Hamas’s
aspiration for freedom of movement, autonomy, and political achievements.
Another crossing like Kerem Shalom, but on the sea, will not satisfy Hamas.
Egyptian opposition, and to a lesser degree, opposition by the Palestinian
Authority, is one of the main reasons why Israel’s political leadership has
not publicly endorsed the seaport plan. Israel has no interest upsetting
Egypt, the important regional actor, which opposes both a strengthened Hamas
and Turkish plans for the reconstruction of Gaza, and perceives Hamas and
Turkey as enemies. Likewise, the PA does not seem fond of such ideas and
fears that Hamas could gain further support by scoring such a notable
political achievement.
Therefore, it appears that the debate on the Gaza seaport should be guided
by three main considerations. First, the port proposals should address the
Gaza population and Hamas’s acute needs for the flow of goods and easier
movement of people to and from Gaza. If the port eventually becomes just
another crossing, perceived by Palestinians as a symbol of Israeli
occupation, it will not substantively change the situation. The fundamental
question, then, is how to meet these needs but without granting Hamas
significant political gains.
Second, the port must meet Israel’s and Egypt’s security concerns. For a
capable third party to supervise the port, it must have the relevant
equipment, technical devices, and the mandate to prevent the transfer of
weapons and dual use materials and machines as well as the exit and entry of
terrorists. However, without actual supervision at the locations where
building materials as well as other dual use materials are to be used, these
arrangements will continue to allow Hamas to divert these materials for
terrorist and military purposes, for example the construction of offensive
tunnels.
Third, construction of the port should include some form of political
understanding between the regional parties that also includes a long term
ceasefire. Neither Israel nor Hamas seeks another round of hostilities
anytime soon. An agreement on the port should therefore be put in the
context of the 2014 ceasefire, which called for indirect negotiations on
construction of a seaport.
Source: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=70210
