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The F-35: Still Failing to Impress
The plane has yet to prove itself capable of performing even the basic
combat tasks used to originally sell the program to the American people.
Operation Steel Knight is an annual event for the Marine Corps. Detailed
planning for it begins at least six months before the first units move out
to the field. Maintenance crews had months to prepare the necessary aircraft
to support this exercise and they still barely managed to get the planes to
fly once every 3 days. A future enemy will likely not be so considerate as
to provide advanced notice.
The F-35: Still Failing to Impress
By: Dan Grazier & Mandy Smithberger | March 7, 2016
http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/weapons/2016/the-f-35-still-failing-to-impress.html
The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) recently released a
scathing assessment of the F-35 program as part of his annual report. Buried
inside 48 pages of highly technical language is a gripping story of
mismanagement, delayed tests, serious safety issues, a software nightmare,
and maintenance problems crippling half the fleet at any given time.
The report makes clear just how far the F-35 program still has to go in the
development process. Some of the technical challenges facing the program
will take years to correct, and as a result, the F-35’s operationally
demonstrated suitability for combat will not be known until 2022 at the
earliest. While rumors that the program office would ask for a block buy of
nearly 500 aircraft in the FY 2017 budget proposal did not pan out,
officials have indicated they may make such a request next year. The DOT&E
report clearly shows any such block commitments before 2022 are premature.
The report’s candor about the airplane’s problems is unique among the DoD’s
other reports about the performance of the F-35. It only exists because
Congress created an independent operational testing office in 1983 to report
only to the Secretary of Defense and Congress. Without this office,
significant F-35 problems might never be revealed until failure in actual
combat.
As damning as this report is, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Office
quickly issued a statement disagreeing with the report’s emphasis—but
acknowledging that every word of it is “factually accurate.”
Officials Continue Putting Off Key Tests Needed to Prove Combat Capability
The F-35 program is already years behind schedule: the first plan was to
have the initial batch of the aircraft available for combat in 2010 and
deployed in 2012. This report shows timelines slipping even more.
Crucial weapons delivery accuracy tests (WDA) serve as a good example. The
weapons test events are important because rather than just testing to make
sure an individual component functions properly, they test the entire kill
chain, “the complete find-fix-identification
(ID)-track-target-engage-assess-kill chain for air-to-air and air-to-ground
mission success.” This means the tests will see if a pilot can locate and
properly identify a target, hit it with the right weapon, and then tell if
the target has been destroyed—just the sort of thing a pilot would have to
do to be effective in combat.
The Joint Strike Fighter Operational Test Team (JOTT) identified 15 WDA
tests for the Block 2B aircraft that the Marine Corps declared ready for
combat last year. Twelve were completed, but 11 of them required the
developmental testers to intervene—and in some cases weaken the test rules
to “less challenging” ones—to help the plane do things like acquire and
identify the target so it could succeed in firing a weapon. Given these
heavy interventions, DOT&E found that in its current configuration the
combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps’ F-35Bs “will depend in part on the
degree to which the enemy’s capabilities exceed the constraints of these
narrow scenarios.” So the F-35 will win only if the enemy decides not to
exceed the F-35’s limited capabilities.
The remaining three tests were pushed to later versions of the plane due to
delays in implementing new software meant to fix mission system sensors and
the data fusion problems. All of the deferred tests relate to the AIM-120
missile, the only weapon the F-35 can currently use against enemy planes.
Tests of the F-35’s ability to fire and drop the majority of its planned
weapons in a combat-realistic operating environment won’t actually begin
until the Block 3F configuration in 2021. Accomplishing those will require a
total of 50 test events.
DOT&E believes these more complicated test events “cannot be accomplished
within the remaining time planned by the Program Office to complete Block 3F
flight test” in May 2017. This would require testing at triple the rate of
what is being accomplished now. But the Block 3F tests will be much more
complex and realistic than the current simpler engineering tests. It is
unlikely more complex tests will be accomplished at the same rate as the
simple testing, much less triple the rate. If, to make up the time, the
program cancels many of these tests or defers them to the next Block as it
has done in the past, “readiness for operational testing and employment in
combat [would be] at serious risk.”
Pushing off tests only adds to what has become a compounding problem. The
program currently has a 5 percent discovery rate for simpler developmental
testing. This means that for every 100 tests, 5 new problems are discovered.
These new discoveries then have to be fixed and tested again, which is a
costly and time-consuming process. Even more troublesome, engineers are
identifying problems faster than they can fix them. Inevitably, as testing
continues and becomes more realistic, more and more problems will be
identified, which will only draw out the process further. According to
DOT&E, recent discoveries that require design changes, modifications, and
regression testing (testing of the fixes) “include the ejection seat for
safe separation, wing fuel tank over-pressurization, and the
life-limitations of the F-35B bulkhead.” The F-35 is already years behind
schedule. Issues like these are guaranteed to make the problem even worse.
Flight Controls Impact Maneuverability
The F-35 has had significant trouble with uncommanded “wing drop.” This
means flaws in the aircraft’s aerodynamics under heavy maneuvering loads
cause the aircraft to occasionally make sudden, uncommanded movements in the
air. To fix this, the program made changes to the software, called the
control law software, that translates the pilot’s commands into the actual
movement of the plane’s flight surfaces. Those changes limit the maneuvers
the pilot can command. Even with those changes, the plane is still
experiencing excessive “buffeting”—intense shaking during certain fighting
maneuvers because the airflow still separates from critical lifting surfaces
under those manuevering conditions.
During one test flight of an F-35C, excessive buffeting “adversely affected
performance in defensive maneuvering where precise control of bank angles
and altitude must be maintained while the F-35C is in a defensive position
and the pilot is monitoring an offensive aircraft.” In both defensive and
offensive maneuvers, buffeting also made it difficult for the pilot to see
the helmet-mounted heads-up display, which could significantly degrade pilot
situational awareness and reduce chances of surviving the fight.
Buffeting and the reduced maneuverability caused by the associated control
law software “fixes” featured prominently in the now famous example of the
F-35 losing 17 dogfights to a 35-year-old, heavily laden F-16. In
non-technical terms, the software fixes that provided a smoother ride for
the pilot and lessened the uncommanded wing drop also limited his ability to
turn hard enough to get away from an enemy plane on his tail. Similarly,
when the F-35 finds itself on the enemy’s tail, the same fixes limit his
ability to turn hard enough to keep up with an enemy plane trying to get
away.
In an attempt to find a less compromising buffet fix, spoilers were fitted
to test F-35s. These spoilers somewhat reduce the separation of airflow from
the wing to lessen the shaking of the airplane during heavy maneuvering, and
test pilots have reported some improvement in the buffeting as a result. But
installing spoilers adds weight and increases drag, which only adds to
problems the F-35 faces from using up almost all of its weight management
safety margins. DOT&E questioned the net effect of the changes saying, “due
to the transient nature of buffet, the operational significance may be low.”
Serious Safety Concerns Remain
Lt. Gen. Bogdan, the F-35 program executive officer, found himself hauled
before a congressional subcommittee hearing in October 2015 after it emerged
that he had grounded pilots weighing less than 136 pounds because mannequin
tests showed that the ejection seat would kill them—and that no mannequin
testing at all had been done for pilots weighing 137 to 244 pounds. The
problem was a result of a number of faults in the seat design, exacerbated
by the extra weight of the high-tech helmet.
This was far from the only F-35 safety issue engineers grappled with during
the past year. For example, the F-35 Block 2B aircraft the Marine Corps
claimed in July 2015 to be ready for combat had 27 serious safety
deficiencies as of the end of October 2015. When DOT&E recognizes an issue,
it is assigned to one of two categories based on severity and whether it
threatens the safe operation of the plane. Category I is the most severe,
being “those which may cause death, severe injury, or severe occupational
illness; may cause loss or major damage to a weapon system; critically
restrict the combat readiness capabilities of the using organization; or
result in a production line stoppage.” The report lists a total of 91
current deficiencies, 27of which are Category I.
In a bit of good news, the Program Office was able to lift the restriction
banning the F-35B from flying within 25 miles of known lightning strikes.
The planes had been barred from doing so because the On-Board Inert Gas
Generation System to add nitrogen and displace oxygen from the empty vapor
spaces in the fuel tanks could not work fast enough to prevent an explosive
mixture of fuel vapor and oxygen from collecting. The system has been fixed
to the point now where the plane can fly in such conditions.
But it still can’t taxi or take off when there is lightning in the area. A
problem with the software that controls the plane’s siphon tanks, which sit
between the main tanks to keep the plane balanced as fuel is consumed, can
cause too much pressure to build up and possibly cause a lightning-induced
fire and explosion.
Significant Logistics Software Problems
Although there are numerous hardware and structural issues remaining,
problems with the software are much more likely to be the JSF Program’s
undoing. Designers and engineers continue struggling through problems with
the F-35’s approximately 8 million lines of onboard software code. Software
remaining on the ground created even more headaches in 2015. The 24 million
lines of complicated computer code running the maintenance and logistics
program known called the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) has
only lately garnered the serious attention required to make the system work.
The DOT&E report provides details of a cascading problem of incremental
software updates—or what Defense One dubbed a “terrifying bug list.” To cite
just one of the many issues, the software can’t tell the difference between
good parts and broken ones when it “incorrectly authorizes
older/inappropriate replacement parts.”
This effectively grounds the plane until the health report problem is
diagnosed and repaired or, in the case of a falsely reported health problem,
a supervisor overrides the system.
The ALIS software went through four different versions in 2015: ALIS 1.0.3,
ALIS 2.0.0, ALIS 2.0.1, and ALIS 2.0.1.1. While evaluating the software,
personnel identified 2 Category I deficiencies and 56 Category II
deficiencies in ALIS 1.0.3. One of the Category I deficiencies, for example,
could prevent aircraft from taking off. The ALIS program keeps track of the
maintenance status of planes in the fleet by generating a Health Reporting
Code (HRC) for each plane. Should the software detect a technical problem in
a plane, it creates a negative health report and depending on its severity,
categorizes the plane as Non-Mission Capable. This effectively grounds the
plane until the health report problem is diagnosed and repaired or, in the
case of a falsely reported health problem, a supervisor overrides the
system. These false positive health reports are not rare. Field reports say
that 80 percent of ALIS-reported problems turn out to be false. This places
a massive extra burden on the F-35’s already over-worked maintenance force.
Unfortunately, ALIS makes supervisor overrides to prevent grounding very
difficult. Two modules in the ALIS system prevent overrides, even after a
recent ALIS software update. The aircraft computer generates the health
reports, which are downloaded into an ALIS module called the Computerized
Maintenance Management System (CMMS). Another module, the Squadron Health
Management Module, makes a mission-ready determination based on Mission
Essential Function List. One module might declare an aircraft mission ready
while the other asserts the opposite. In those cases a maintenance
supervisor who has determined that the aircraft is ready should have the
ability to override the system in order to clear the plane to fly.
Unfortunately a software problem in the Squadron module prevented this from
happening.
The test team noted this problem remained in ALIS 2.0.0 (in addition to
finding five more Category I deficiencies) and still remained in ALIS 2.0.1.
Developers finally fixed the problem with a “patch” in ALIS 2.0.1.1, yet
five more major problems were discovered.
The report also notes that all versions of the ALIS software have problems
with data quality and integrity. This is particularly true with the system’s
Electronic Equipment Logbooks (EELs), a system for tracking aircraft parts.
This system frequently fails to create accurate entries or to transfer data
properly, forcing maintenance crews to waste time with manual workarounds.
According to the report: “Without accurate EELs data, ALIS can improperly
ground an aircraft or permit an aircraft to fly when it should not.”
History and experience suggests the problems with ALIS are only beginning.
The more complex and lengthy a software program is, the better the chance
coding errors will plague the system. According to one IT consultant, even
in well-written programs, developers find bugs at a rate of 1 per every
1,000 lines of code. In fixing the one problem, software patches tend to
introduce new bugs and security vulnerabilities at a rate of 10 to 15
percent. The DOT&E report certainly appears to confirm this in the case of
ALIS.
Deferring Cyber Security Testing Leaves F-35 Vulnerable
Nearly all of the promised capabilities of the F-35 rely on its
sophisticated network of computer-based systems, both on the ground and in
the plane itself. The sensors to locate and identify enemy targets, guidance
systems to direct missiles and bombs, diagnostic tools to isolate defective
parts and order spares, the pilot’s helmet-mounted display, and even the
mission order packages all operate on computers and complicated software. As
has been repeatedly proven over the years, systems like these are tempting
targets for hackers. Pentagon officials have already acknowledged the F-35
program suffered a major breach when a foreign power, presumably China,
hacked into an unclassified F-35 contractor computer network and stole
massive technical data files.
But despite these risks, the Joint Program Office has refused to subject the
program to the kind of cyber testing necessary to identify and fix
vulnerabilities. As we previously reported, the JOTT created a two-part test
plan to evaluate the program. The first, an internal assessment to comb
through the system’s designs to identify potential problems, was only
partially completed on isolated modules at Edwards Air Force Base. Even
these limited tests revealed “significant deficiencies,” although the DOT&E
report did not provide any details as to their nature.
…the F-35 program management cancelled tests of a combat-critical computer
system because they thought the tests might break the computer system.
The second crucial phase of testing, which unleashes DoD “Red teams” of
hackers to break into the system, did not happen at all. General Bogdan
refused to grant permission for the Red Team tests “due to insufficient
understanding of risks posed to the operational ALIS systems by
cybersecurity testing.” Put in less obscure terms, the F-35 program
management cancelled tests of a combat-critical computer system because they
thought the tests might break the computer system.
The reason testing takes place is to ensure the programs and systems the
services are buying work properly in peacetime and war. The program office
validated the strong need for F-35 cyber testing in the reasoning they gave
for cancelling it. The computer glitch that allows ALIS to ground an
aircraft would be an obvious target for an enemy cyber warrior. Even more
tempting would be stealing mission order packages or planting false ones. If
peacetime cyber testing can damage the ALIS system, what could a determined
enemy do?
Maintenance Problems Keep F-35s Grounded
All of the time and money expended on the F-35 will have been for naught if
the plane can’t get off the ground when it is most needed. Unless the
program improves dramatically in basic availability, nearly half of the
F-35s in the fleet will not be able to fly at any given time due to a
variety of persistent maintenance issues. Maintenance crews have had so much
trouble keeping the aircraft flight-worthy that most planes fly less than
twice in a typical work week.
During 2015, 10-20 percent of all F-35’s in service were undergoing major
overhauls, according to the report. Of those that remained, only “half were
available to fly all missions of even a limited capability set.” The program
had set a goal of 60 percent availability to fly for 2015, but the entire
fleet only averaged 51 percent. This actually represented a marked
improvement“over the 37 percent availability reported in both of the
previous two DOT&E Annual Reports from FY13 and FY14.” However, it still
falls far below the 80 percent availability rate generally considered
minimally adequate for any military aircraft on a real combat deployment.
Evaluators are actually prevented from accessing the database from
government networks because Lockheed Martin’s database does not meet U.S.
Cyber Command cybersecurity standards.
The DOT&E report reviews a number of maintenance metrics, but those metrics
are suspect because they are stored by the contractor in an unsecured
database and, according to the report, is neither current nor validated by
government oversight. Evaluators are actually prevented from accessing the
database from government networks because Lockheed Martin’s database does
not meet U.S. Cyber Command cybersecurity standards. The evaluators have
received hard copies of some of the data but have been unable to review and
validate all of the contractor maintenance records including availability
rates and reliability numbers.
While the program’s specific maintenance numbers remain obscure, the sortie
rate is not. The test aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base were only able to
fly once every 5 days (6 flights per month). Operational units at other
bases reported similar numbers: Luke AFB F-35s averaged 1 flight every 5
days, and F-35s at Nellis AFB averaged 1 flight every 4.75 days.
The report lists a few of the “High Driver Components Affecting Low
Availability and Reliability,” or the most common broken parts affecting the
fleet in general. Computer components on all variants failed at a high rate,
as did fuel pumps and main landing gear tires. Crews also had to work hard
to fix problems with the plane’s stealth coatings. Low Observable
Maintenance, or fixing stealth components, is time consuming in part because
the necessary skin panels, sealants, and paints to make the plane harder to
track with radar are delicate, have long cure times, and are potentially
highly toxic. “From July 2014 to June 2015, program records show that
maintenance on ‘attaching hardware,’ such as nutplates and heat blankets,
absorbed approximately 20 percent of all unscheduled maintenance time, while
low observable repairs accounted for 15 percent,” according to the report.
In a combat situation or for large training exercises, units operate at what
is known as a surge rate and, to meet short-term demands, must generate more
flights per day than the sustained rate. To do so, crews work overtime
beforehand to ensure a maximum number of aircraft are prepared to fly and
then afterwards to repair the extra maintenance issues put off during the
surge period.
The Marine Corps surged F-35 operations to support Operation Steel Knight, a
large-scale air-ground exercise at Twentynine Palms, California, in December
2015. They planned to use 8 F-35Bs to fly close air support missions for the
ground units over the course of 8 days. The schedule called for each
aircraft to fly approximately 1 sortie per day. But even under short-term
surge conditions, the squadron could only manage 1 sortie every 2.3 days.
According to the report, “while deployed, and in support of the exercise,
the Marine Corps flew approximately 46 percent of the planned sorties (28
sorties flown versus 61 sorties planned), not including the deployment,
redeployment, and local familiarization sorties.”
Operation Steel Knight is an annual event for the Marine Corps. Detailed
planning for it begins at least six months before the first units move out
to the field. Maintenance crews had months to prepare the necessary aircraft
to support this exercise and they still barely managed to get the planes to
fly once every 3 days. A future enemy will likely not be so considerate as
to provide advanced notice.
Simulation Facility Failure Threatens Testing Program
The only way to test many of the F-35’s capabilities is in a virtual
simulated environment because the test ranges cannot accurately replicate
the full spectrum and quantity of threats the jets would confront.
Contractor engineers have been tasked since 2001 with creating a testing
facility called the Verification Simulator (VSim). It was intended to be an
ultra-realistic, thoroughly test-validated “man-in-the-loop, mission systems
software in-the-loop simulation developed to meet the operational test
requirements for Block 3F IOT&E.” The final decision Congress makes to go
into full-rate production will be based on tests conducted in facility like
this. A similar system, the Air Combat Simulation (ACS), was used by the
F-22 program to fly scenarios not possible in open-air range tests using
realistic threat numbers and tactics. According to the report, the facility
fell hopelessly behind and has now been reassigned to a government agency.
For over five years, DOT&E has raised concerns about the failure of the
project and its dire consequences for completing adequate operational
testing. In 2010 DOT&E, faulting the JSF Program Office for assigning low
priority to and shortchanging the project, bluntly “identified funding
shortfalls for the Verification Simulation (VSIM) to meet OT&E needs,
primarily in the battlespace environment, and provided data for an
independent cost assessment leading to inclusion of VSIM costs in the
program baseline.”
Following the 2010 Nunn-McCurdy restructuring of the JSF program, $250
million in funding was added to the F-35 budget for the Verification
Simulation Facility. Despite the potential for conflicts of interest, the
program office rejected a plan for the government to build the simulator in
2011 and decided to leave the contract with Lockheed Martin, but then, in
August 2015, the Verification Simulation project was transferred to Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) because so little progress had been made,
Fifteen years after the project began, it is now beginning all over again
from scratch.
To create and validate this high-fidelity virtual world suitable for combat
test missions, the simulation designers will need to conduct many actual
F-35 flights to gather onboard data on maneuvering performance, handling
qualities, flight controls, radar, infrared imagery, weapons trajectories,
and homing behavior in the presence of representative terrain and realistic
ground and air threats. This is intended to be the basis for digitally
recreating “the F-35 and other supporting aircraft, and models of airborne
and ground-based threats.” These models are to be combined with information
about the projected threats to build a full Battlespace Environment capable
of realistically simulating large arrays of friendly and enemy forces to
test the F-35’s combat effectiveness in the complexity of real combat.
As an example of the difficulty and scope of the needed validation effort, a
test pilot will fly a mission over a range set up with multiple enemy radar
and missile systems. The real F-35’s sensors, electronic warfare system, and
intelligence links detect this threat and respond accordingly, providing
pilot warnings, signal jamming, defense suppression missile firings, or any
number of other responses. All the data, massive amounts from all the
instruments, from the real-world test flight is gathered and then compared
against the data from the Verification Simulation’s recreation of exactly
the same flight test scenario. When such measured outcome comparisons show
reasonably similar behavior over many test flight scenarios, then the
Verification Simulation can be declared valid. This process takes years, and
the fact that it hasn’t been diligently pursued since its inception 15 years
ago puts the entire effort even further behind.
The actual simulation facility was intended to have four high fidelity F-35
cockpits and eight additional threat and friendly aircraft control stations
to allow real people to “fly” complex missions with and against the F-35s.
This was to conduct tests of large multi-ship flights of F-35s against dense
air and ground threats. These are the hardest, most expensive, but most
important operational tests to conduct with real airplanes and threat
simulators.
The Verification Simulation facility was also intended to test the
networking of onboard and offboard sensor and intelligence data between all
F-35s in a formation. This networking capability remains one of the biggest
selling points of the plane. Called data fusion, it is supposed to create an
identical operating picture for all the pilots during a mission. So far, the
program has encountered major deficiencies in data fusion in even the most
basic engineering flight tests. Specifically, the onboard computers have
been unable to usefully merge the target data from fourF-35s flying in an
area free of enemy interference. Using the Verification Simulation facility
in more realistic and complicated combat test scenarios would likely uncover
even more problems. If the F-35 program proves unable to deliver this
capability, the entire reasoning behind the program would be questioned.
DOT&E reserved some of its harshest criticism for failures in the
Verification Simulation project. “Due to inadequate leadership and
management on the part of both the Program Office and the contractor, the
program has failed to develop and deliver an adequate Verification
Simulation (VSim) for use by either the developmental test team or the JSF
Operational Test Team (JOTT), as has been planned for the past eight years
and is required in the approved TEMP.”
Without a validated simulation facility the F-35 program would have to
conduct “a significant number of additional open-air flights during IOT&E,
in addition to those previously planned” in order to complete testing on
time. Since the plane already can’t fly often enough for the current
developmental testing schedule, expecting to be able to stuff in the
necessary additional flights is unreasonable.
DOT&E does not have much confidence in NAVAIR’s ability to construct the
necessary facility to fully test the F-35 in time to meet the current test
schedule. “It is also clear that both NAVAIR and the Program Office
significantly underestimated the scope of work, the cost, and the time
required to replace Lockheed Martin’s proprietary BSE (Battle Space
Environment) with the JSE (Joint Simulation Environment) while integrating
and validating the required high-fidelity models for the F-35, threats,
friendly forces, and other elements of the combat environment.”
Without a validated simulation facility the F-35 program would have to
conduct “a significant number of additional open-air flights during IOT&E,
in addition to those previously planned” in order to complete testing on
time. Since the plane already can’t fly often enough for the current
developmental testing schedule, expecting to be able to stuff in the
necessary additional flights is unreasonable.
At best the Program Office merely dropped the ball in failing to devote the
proper amount of effort to establish a needed facility. Congress should
audit what happened in the VSim program to determine why it failed and
whether taxpayers deserve a refund. The program office’s failure increases
the risk that shortcomings with the F-35 program may only be revealed in
actual combat. This would likely result in failed missions and needless
casualties.
Impending Air Force IOC: Aircraft Would Be Combat-Ready in Name Only
The DOT&E report also provides further proof that the Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) declaration by the Marine Corps last summer was nothing
more than a public relations stunt and that the Air Force’s planned
declaration later this year will be as well. Then-Marine Corps Commandant
Gen. Joe Dunford (now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) announced on
July 31, 2015, that the Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121 at Yuma, Arizona,
“has ten aircraft in the Block 2B configuration with the requisite
performance envelope and weapons clearances, to include the training,
sustainment capabilities, and infrastructure to deploy to an austere site or
a ship.” In other words, the Marine Corps claimed to have 10 F-35s ready for
combat and enough spare parts and maintenance personnel to support the
squadron.
But DOT&E found that significant combat deficiencies remain. “If used in
combat, the Block 2B F-35 will need support from command and control
elements to avoid threats, assist in target acquisition, and control weapons
employment for the limited weapons carriage available (i.e., two bombs, two
air-to-air missiles),” wrote Dr. Gilmore. The report also states, “If in an
opposed combat scenario, the F-35 Block 2B aircraft would need to avoid
threat engagement and would require augmentation by other friendly forces.”
This means the F-35Bs the Marine Corps said are ready for combat would need
to run away from enemy planes while other aircraft would be needed to come
to their rescue.
Air Force officials have repeatedly stated their plans to declare Block 3i
of the F-35A—the conventional take-off model—combat ready in August (with a
December fail-safe date), as scheduled. Block 3i configuration has a newer
computer but the same extremely limited weapons and combat capabilities as
the 2B. On the current schedule, the Air Force will declare initial combat
capability with planes that, like the Marines’ variant, will have to run
from enemy fighters, need other airplanes to help find targets and avoid
threats, and carry only two air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons.
Testing has actually revealed that the newer hardware and software used by
the Air Force is sometimes in worse shape that the earlier Block 2B used by
the Marines. This is especially troubling because officials had written the
Block 3i testing plan simply “to confirm Block 3i had equivalent
capabilities to those demonstrated in Block 2A (for 3iR1) and Block 2B.” The
testing office originally planned for 514 baseline testing points. During
the baseline testing, another 364 additional “discovery” testing points were
identified. This means that during testing, 364 additional tests had to be
added to try to fix newly discovered problems in a system that was already
supposed to work and only had added a new computer. For example, DOT&E
reported the unacceptable “instability” (that is, frequent crashing) of the
Block 2B computer-based radar. In fact, Block 3i radar performance was found
to be “less stable” than Block 2B. The 3i radar now crashes 7.5 times more
often than the earlier version.
The F-35A will be hampered with limitations on both basic flight and weapons
employment. The same problem preventing F-35s from taking off in a lightning
storm also prevents them from performing hard maneuvers with full fuel
tanks. Fully fueled F-35’s are limited to only 3 g’s because harder
maneuvering could increase the pressure in the siphon tanks beyond their
limits. The plane is also limited from opening its weapons doors to fire at
speeds above Mach 1.2 due to concerns about structural vibrations called
“flutter.” This is less than the plane’s maximum allowable speed of Mach
1.6. Since the F-35 was sold as a supersonic fighter, this restriction
negates one of the major capabilities used to justify the massive bill to
the American people.
In a congressionally mandated 2013 report, the Department of Defense set the
dates and criteria for IOC. In the case of the Air Force, “F-35A IOC shall
be declared when Airmen are trained, manned and equipped to conduct basic
CAS, Interdiction, and limited SEAD/DEAD operations in a contested
environment.” The Air Force set its target IOC date as August 2016 with
December 2016 as a backup. The report also states, “Should capability
delivery experience additional changes, this estimate will be revised
appropriately.”
As is clearly evident in the DOT&E report, the criteria necessary for the
Air Force to declare IOC have yet to be met. The aircraft will have little,
if any real combat capability for years to come. And with as much trouble as
the services have had keeping their planes flightworthy, it is nearly
impossible for all the pilots to have acquired enough real flying hours to
develop the combat skills they need. Despite these issues the Air Force is
widely expected to make its declaration on time in August. Like the Marine
Corps’ declaration last year, it will be nothing more than a PR stunt meant
to keep money flowing into the program.
Concurrency Tax: Extra Costs for Few Aircraft
As part of the efforts to reform how the Pentagon buys equipment, Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank
Kendall has urged the Pentagon “fly before you buy.” The F-35 program has
done the opposite. Current purchase plans would see the services with
approximately 340 F-35s by the end of the next fiscal year, long before
IOT&E is complete. Instead, the F-35 program has experienced an
unprecedented level of concurrency, approving increasing levels of
production years before development and testing can possibly be completed.
The GAO estimates concurrency in the F-35 program will cost $1.7 billion to
“rework and retrofit aircraft with design changes needed as a result of test
discoveries.” As planes continue to come off the production line long before
testing has uncovered all the design defects, much less their fixes, that
figure will dramatically increase.
The level of concurrency in the F-35 program causes it “to expend resources
to send aircraft for major re-work, often multiple times, to keep up with
the aircraft design as it progresses.” (Emphasis added) Some retrofits are a
normal part of the acquisition process. But the level of production and rate
of newly emerging design failures mean there are an unprecedented number of
planes that must be altered at significant expense. For example, by the end
of 2017 the program will have delivered nearly 200 aircraft that almost
certainly will not be in the 3F configuration necessary for IOT&E.
These concurrency orphans would likely serve as little more than costly
sources of spare parts or un-representative test beds.
There is a very real danger some of the problems can’t be fixed within
affordable budgets. During static strength and fatigue testing there have
been large numbers of demonstrated structural flaws, including cracking and
metal fatigue in the wing structure, fuselage bulkheads, and almost every
door on the airplane. DOT&E cautions the services may be stuck with numerous
left-behind aircraft they can’t afford to upgrade: “these modifications may
be unaffordable for the Services as they consider the cost of upgrading
these early lots of aircraft while the program continues to increase
production rates in a fiscally-constrained environment.” These concurrency
orphans would likely serve as little more than costly sources of spare parts
or un-representative test beds.
The cost to implement retrofits and the purchase price of planes made
obsolete because they never are fixed add up to the program’s “concurrency
tax.” With several years of development and testing still to come, the
amount of this tax will continue to spiral ever upwards.
Block Buy Purchase Discussions Are Wildly Premature
JSF Program officials both inside the government and Lockheed Martin have
repeatedly expressed their desire to move beyond low rate initial
production. They want Congress to authorize a block buy for 465 planes—with
commensurate large pre-payment—for the United States and foreign military
partners beginning in 2018. General Bogdan claims such a move would save
“billions of dollars.” The DOT&E report not only pokes holes in the
cost-saving claims, but more importantly questions the legality of such a
commitment. It is perhaps telling that officials are seeking a block buy at
this point rather than a multi-year purchase contract.
Federal law allows multiple year contracts to purchase government property
so long as certain criteria have been met. Congress typically authorizes
most weapons buying programs on a year-by-year basis to ensure proper
oversight of the program and to maintain incentives for the contractor to
satisfactorily perform. According to Title 10 U.S.C., Section 2306b, for a
program to be eligible for multiyear procurement, the contract must promote
national security, should result in substantial savings, have little chance
of being reduced, and have a stable design. The F-35 seems to be failing at
least two of the first three criteria and is most certainly is failing the
fourth.
Multi-year contracts afford some protections to the taxpayers. But the
program office is proposing a block buy, which provides significantly fewer
protections for taxpayers.
As the DOT&E report shows, the operational testing that needs to take place
in order for an informed final production decision will not be completed
until 2021.
Multi-year contracts afford some protections to the taxpayers. But the
program office is proposing a block buy, which provides significantly fewer
protections for taxpayers. As a Congressional Research Service report points
out, block buy contract savings can be lower than those promised under
multiyear procurement, and are not governed by any precautionary statutory
requirements.
Conclusion
The JSF Program has already been in development for more than twenty years.
The plane is still years away from being capable of providing any real
contribution to the national defense if, in fact, it ever will be. The
issues raised with this program are important for everyone, citizens and
decision-makers alike to understand. There is already discussion in the
halls of the Capitol and the corridors of the Pentagon about the next
fighter plane program beyond the F-35. Unless everyone learns from their
mistakes with this program, history will be repeated. The United States can
ill-afford another $1.4 trillion mistake that will do more to harm our
national security than it does to secure it.
The DOT&E report makes perfectly clear that any further F-35 production at
this point is unwise. The plane has yet to prove itself capable of
performing even the basic combat tasks used to originally sell the program
to the American people. Congress should scrutinize carefully any further
production proposal, as only the contractors will benefit from turning out
airplanes that can’t fight and that will carry a crushing retrofit bill. The
rest of us—particularly those who fight our wars—will be left to bear the
cost.
Source: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=70188
