| Online: | |
| Visits: | |
| Stories: |
On the fundamental problem with conceptualization and how to handle it
The fundamental problem with conceptualization is, as already Aristotle concluded, that difference must be more fundamental than similarity is, because whereas there is only one kind of similarity, there are two kinds of differences – pure difference and difference in a similarity, which Aristotle called generic and specific difference, respectively – since it means that every similarity is paradoxically contradictory between at least two such differences (ie, one generic and one specific). Every similarity must thus also be a difference, but this difference must also be paradoxically contradictory between at least one generic and one specific difference.
In practice, this problem means that every classification (that isn’t orthogonal, like Linnean systematics) sooner or later runs into the problem that the top-bottom direction doesn’t fit into the bottom-top direction, thus enforcing a class collecting “the rest” (or some other flexibility in the classification). In cladistics, however, this problem isn’t recognized, and no flexibility is allowed, meaning that cladistics instead lacks a consistent solution, ie, is inconsistent. It means that cladists can search forever for a consistent solution of their idea without finding any, because there isn’t any.
This fundamental problem with conceptualization is also what Bertrand Russell discovered and demonstrated with his “Russell’s paradox”.
This fundamental problem with conceptualization is thus not unknown, rather well-known, but just difficult to understand. Its problem to be generally recognized is due to our tendency to simplify matters instead of going the distance. When matters get complicated, we simply prefer conflating concepts instead of putting them together consistently. However, if we go the distance, we discover this problem, as thus already Aristotle did (and also Bertrand Russell).
Thus enlightened, we can understand the inconsistency of realist approaches like cladistics and particle physics. The question then becomes whether we shall spend our time battling over-simplifying realists (like cladists and particle physicists), which actually already have been defeated, or to develop the consistent approach. The former is important politically, since realists also are racists, but the latter is important in all scientific applications. I have thus chosen to do the first on my sparetime and the latter on my working hours.
Another contribution to understanding of conceptualization http://menvall.wordpress.com/
Source: https://menvall.wordpress.com/2015/03/04/on-the-fundamental-problem-with-conceptualization-and-how-to-handle-it/
