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WikiLeaks: It Was All About The Oil
WikiLeaks cables show that it was all about the oil
By Kevin G. Hall | McClatchy Newspapers
WASHINGTON — In 2006, three years after the Russian government had charged Mikhail Khodorkovsky — then the country's wealthiest businessman — with fraud and moved to break up his Yukos oil company, U.S. diplomats had had enough.
Gazprom, which grew out of the former Soviet Union's state gas ministry, had been busy buying up Yukos' far-flung empire, stoking American fears that soon Russia and its tough leader, Vladimir Putin, would control virtually all of the natural gas flowing to Europe.
The United States wanted to stop that from happening. So the American embassy in Slovakia hired a Texas-based oil consultant and began secretly advising the Slovakian government on how to buy the 49 percent stake Yukos had held in Transpetrol, the Slovakian oil pipeline company.
With no oil experience of its own, the Slovakian government didn't know how much it should pay. The consultant, who sat in on the negotiations, assured Slovakia's economy minister, Lubomir Jahnatek, that the $120 million price offered to the group disposing of Yukos' assets was a bargain. Gazprom was willing to pay far more.
"We have made it clear to all parties that we do not want to publicize our role as technical advisors," the embassy said in an Aug. 10, 2006, cable that outlined what eventually became a deal. "Jahnatek is clearly appreciative of the input provided by (the consultant), and will continue to look to him and the U.S. embassy for information as he faces the challenges to the deal in the coming weeks."
The communication, part of the cache of State Department cables that WikiLeaks passed to McClatchy and other news organizations, is just one indication of how the U.S. government over the years has maneuvered to influence the world's oil and natural gas markets.
With oil trading near $100 a barrel and gasoline near $4 a gallon at the pump, Americans can take solace in knowing that securing sources of oil has been a chief focus of U.S. embassies across the globe for years.
Of the 251,287 WikiLeaks documents McClatchy obtained, 23,927 of them — nearly one in 10 — reference oil. Gazprom alone is mentioned in 1,789.
In the cables, U.S. diplomats can be found plotting ways to prevent state entities such as Gazprom from taking control of key petroleum facilities, pressing oil companies to adjust their policies to match U.S. foreign policy goals, helping U.S.-based oil companies arrange deals on favorable terms and pressing foreign governments to assist companies that are willing to do the U.S.'s bidding.
Sometimes the U.S. approach seems mystifying. An Aug. 17, 2009, secret cable from the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, recalled how days earlier the U.S. charge d'affaires, Richard Erdman, pushed Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ali al Naimi to get closer to China.
But there was an ulterior motive. At the time, the United States was trying to persuade China to back sanctions against Iran over the country's nuclear fuel enrichment program. The U.S. believes the program is part of an Iranian effort to develop nuclear weapons. "We wouldn't mind seeing Saudi sales replacing some of Iran's oil exports to China. This would have the welcome side impact of reducing Iranian leverage over China," Erdman told Naimi in a cable.
Naimi responded that Saudi Arabia, a bitter rival to Iran, would soon be the largest oil supplier to China, and it came to pass. In 2010, Saudi Arabia was the top oil supplier to China. Iran was third, according to the Chinese website ChinaOilWeb.
A July 30, 2009, secret cable from the U.S embassy in Riyadh recounts how Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, while visiting the kingdom, leaned on his Saudi counterpart, Ibrahim al Assaf, to contain rising oil prices.
"Geithner said that it would be positive for the global recovery if oil prices did not rise further, whether from speculation or OPEC production," the cable said, noting that Geithner admitted "that the U.S. had not found a 'good way' to limit oil-price volatility."
The documents also show how in their global hunt for oil, companies from allied countries and foes alike complicate U.S. policy objectives.
One target of repeated U.S. ire is the Rome-based oil giant Eni, Italy's largest corporation and one in which the Italian government holds a 30 percent stake. Both efforts to expand its presence in Iran and its close ties to Russia's Gazprom are frequent topics in the cables.
"Eni CEO Paolo Scaroni told the ambassador that the Iranian energy minister has offered Eni investment opportunities in Iran's South Pars and Azadegan oil fields," said a secret cable from the U.S. embassy in Rome dated Jan. 12, 2007. "Scaroni said Eni is interested in additional investment in Iran so long as there are no multilateral sanctions against Iran in effect, Iran pays money owed Eni under existing contracts, and the investments are structured so that Eni's return is based on world oil and gas prices."
The embassy was particularly unhappy that Eni sought to structure its new business in Iran in such a way that it could claim that Iran was merely repaying old debts owed to the company, some dating to the 1950s. That would allow Eni to help Iran develop the fields and skirt any sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program, which the U.S. believes is intended to develop nuclear weapons.
