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This sober reasoning brings to mind the related matter of Israel’s “bomb in the basement,” or deliberate nuclear ambiguity. The credibility of Israel’s still hidden or “opaque” nuclear deterrent must depend, in some measure, on the perceived “usability” of its nuclear arsenal.
Should Israel’s own nuclear weapons be perceived by prospective attackers as very high-yield, inherently indiscriminate, “city-busting” (counter-value) weapons, rather than as minimal-yield, “war fighting” [counterforce] weapons, they might not deter.
Ironically, contrary to prevailing conventional wisdom on the subject, successful Israeli nuclear deterrence could sometime vary inversely with perceived destructiveness.
Going forward, this means that Israel’s nuclear deterrent will require not only recognizably secure second-strike forces, but also weapons that could reasonably be used in war …. http://www.jpost.com