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Dr. Kobi Michael responds to IMRA: Not a parody: proposal of
In response to the IMRA comment regarding his article(see below), Dr. Kobi =
Michael noted that he did not recommend unilateral action on the part of =
Israel but instead notes the importance of international legitimacy for =
Israeli actions.
IMRA followed up with the following question:
You wrote about Jordan and Egypt being =93full and responsible partners in =
the =
process=94.
Two questions:
#1. By =93full and responsible partners in the process=94, do you mean =
participate in the negotiating =93process=94 or participate in the =93proce=
ss=94 of =
implementation?
#2. If you mean participation in implementation, I was hoping you might wan=
t =
to specifically address the focus of the comment, namely that it is far fro=
m =
certain that Jordan and Egypt will be either =93responsible=94 or =93partne=
rs=94 in =
the future and thus policymakers must take care not to promote programs =
whose success hinges on the efficacy of Jordanian or Egyptian participation.
The following is Dr. Kobi Michael’s reply:
Monday, February 24, 2014 10:19 AM
To: ‘Dr. Aaron Lerner’
Subject: RE: Follow up – two questions – would like to circulate your reply
Good morning,
Thank you for reading and interest.
Regarding the first question the idea is that these countries should be =
responsible partners and therefore they should be part of the process =
including the negotiation in this way or another. You can not expect them =
fulfilling a meaningful role at the end of the process without being =
involved in the process itself. I think that in this regard their =
contribution might be found as more significant than the American one.
Regarding the second question, I did not go so far and just made a general =
idea but dealing with seriousness, I would say the both countries have =
demonstrated seriousness and political wisdom during the last turbulent =
events in the region.
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D
Dr. Aaron Lerner – IMRA: Buried inside this article by Kobi Michael we have
the following:
“In addition, it seems that to enable the establishment of a viable
Palestinian state, additional consideration should be given to the
limitations of the bilateral track and the logic and reconsideration of a
multilateral regional track, in which especially Jordan and Egypt will
become full and responsible partners in the process, or alternatively a
unilateral Israeli measure with the support of the international community.”
That’s right.
After he presents all kinds of requirements for arrangements with the
Palestinians he turns around and suggest we prepare to retreat (aka
“unilateral Israeli measure”) in an arrangement that apparently relies on
Jordan and Egypt.
A suggestion to Kobi Michael and all the others who apparently are so fixed
on our pulling out of the West Bank come-what-may: follow the news.
In all due respect to Jordan and Egypt, neither of them are in a position
today that it is a safe bet as to who will be in charge there in another
decade and what ramifications this will have for Israel.
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Security Arrangements: A 4-Level Game
INSS Insight No. 519, February 20, 2014
Kobi Michael .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=3D4538&articleid=3D6632
SUMARY: In recent weeks, efforts by US Secretary of State Kerry to achieve
an Israeli-Palestinian framework agreement have focused on an attempt to
have the parties agree on security arrangements in the Jordan Valley.
Secretary Kerry apparently presumes that Israel=92s concerns about security
issues are the main obstacle to progress, and that once Israel=92s concerns
are met, further progress on the political process toward an agreement will
be possible. What is troubling about this attitude is its rather
one-dimensional view of the security question. The US paradigm is military
in substance, and does not address other aspects, certainly not adequately.
In fact, it is important to achieve security for Israel through a
combination of four elements: the military element; the element of
Palestinian governance and the statehood (political) logic guiding the
future Palestinian state; the element of regional cooperation; and the
element of international legitimacy.
In recent weeks, efforts by US Secretary of State Kerry to achieve an
Israeli-Palestinian framework agreement have focused on an attempt to have
the parties agree on security arrangements in the Jordan Valley. The major
issues at hand pertain to the scope of the Israeli military force in the
region, the duration of its stay, and the nature of its activity. Secretary
Kerry apparently presumes that Israel=92s concerns about security issues are
the main obstacle to progress, and that once Israel=92s concerns are met,
further progress on the political process toward an agreement will be
possible. What is troubling about this attitude is its rather
one-dimensional view of the security question. The US paradigm is military
in substance, and does not address other aspects, certainly not adequately.
In fact, it is important to achieve security for Israel through a
combination of four elements: the military element; the element of
Palestinian governance and the statehood (political) logic guiding the
future Palestinian state; the element of regional cooperation; and the
element of international legitimacy.
Taken together, these four components represent a whole of sorts, with the
relative weight of each element necessarily derived from the prevailing
circumstances. The weight of each element can therefore change according to
the circumstances. Moreover, a system of reciprocal relations exists between
the elements: strengthening and enhancing one element makes it possible to
change/weaken the importance of another element. Approaching the security
question as a dynamic combination of elements that interface and exert
mutual influence creates room for maneuver and flexibility in formulating an
agreement between the parties and an understanding of the possible changes
over time. Necessary, then, is an analysis of the issue on four levels. It
appears that particularly the discussion of Palestinian governance and its
political theory vis-=E0-vis the adoption of statehood rationale is neglect=
ed
in the context of security.
From the perspective of Israel=92s interests, a viable Palestinian state th=
at
takes governmental responsibility and exercises a monopoly on the use of
force is an essential condition for ensuring stability and security. A
Palestinian state that falls into the pattern of a failed state is liable to
become a subversive and hostile entity and develop into a grave security
threat to Israel. The transition from a sub-state entity with a questionable
performance level to a viable, vital, and functioning state can take place
through a gradual and responsible state building process with the support of
the international community and Israel.
A viable state is one that exercises effective sovereignty through an
effective central government free of (violent) subversion and has the
capacity to:
a. Exercise its authority/impose its sovereignty over the population in
its area of responsibility Including a monopoly on the use of force while
complying with the principles of law and order;
b. Supply the needs of the population for which it is responsible, along
with the population=92s human security;
c. Be acknowledged by the population as the responsible element;
d. Recognize the right of the neighboring countries to exist, respect
their right to self-determination, and fulfill its responsibility to these
countries and the international community in a manner that serves and
supports regional stability and security.
It therefore follows that a viable state is one that effectively and
consistently exercises sovereignty over its citizens and conducts reciprocal
relations with its neighbors, the region, and the international community
with responsibility and accountability. An important condition for ensuring
that a country is viable is its ability to exist independently, which is
linked to its ability to survive and adapt to a complex and dynamic reality
as a function of its degree of (in)dependence on external parties =96 the l=
ess
dependence, the more viability.
The more the Palestinian Authority (PA) resembles a viable state that
behaves according to political reasoning, the easier it will be for Israel
to show more flexibility on security arrangements and increase the
Palestinian areas of responsibility in place of the physical presence of
Israeli forces. On the other hand, any evidence that the PA is acting in a
divided and chaotic environment without political reasoning, which first and
foremost means a monopoly on the use of organized force, or evidence that
the Palestinian institutional system continues to demonstrate functional
weakness and that the Palestinian state is unable to act as a viable state,
means that Israel will be less willing to forego some of its security
demands or to show more flexibility.
The international community, especially the US, the moderate Arab countries,
and Israel, have an important role in increasing the chances that a viable
Palestinian state will arise. To this end, the international community
cannot continue adhering to its familiar format for activity and support for
the PA. Rather, targets, milestones, and especially benchmarks for
performance and success should be defined in a controlled process that
accompanies and guides the Palestinians.
In addition, it seems that to enable the establishment of a viable
Palestinian state, additional consideration should be given to the
limitations of the bilateral track and the logic and reconsideration of a
multilateral regional track, in which especially Jordan and Egypt will
become full and responsible partners in the process, or alternatively a
unilateral Israeli measure with the support of the international community.
Both alternatives require the greatest possible international legitimacy for
Israel, which is precisely the incentive for Israel to cooperate with the
international community in order to achieve one of two goals: either a
responsible Palestinian entity acting in accordance with political logic, or
a unilateral Israeli convergence measure that will make it possible to
withdraw from territory while maintaining Israel=92s ability to take securi=
ty
action in the evacuated territories if necessary with broad international
support.
The distress of the moderate Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Egypt, and their concern about deterioration in the regional theater
resulting from domestic unrest, the spread of radical Islamic terrorism, the
escalation of the Sunni-Shiite conflict, and Iran=92s growth as a regional
power, combined with the perceived weakness of the US as a leading power,
heightens the common interests of Israel and important countries in the
region. This time, however, Israel must take advantage of the concern of the
moderate countries in the Arab world, and taking the initiative, demand
responsibility from the Arab world in exchange for Israel=92s consent to the
establishment of a viable Palestinian state. In a certain sense, this is a
case of historic justice, because the Arab world bears real responsibility
for the creation of the refugee problem and hence also for solving it.
It appears that Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt can lead the Arab axis and
take upon themselves the necessary obligations once an agreement is
achieved. The Arab world will presumably have a more significant and
restraining influence on the Palestinians, due to their clear interest in
ensuring regional stability. The main incentive for the success of the
negotiations should be the strengthening of the regional standing of the
three leading Arab states and the entire moderate axis, and the weakening of
Iran=92s regional influence.
Israel=92s willingness to make concessions for an overall regional agreement
should be given as a deposit not to the Palestinians, but to the Arab world,
led by the three regional leaders, with guarantees from the international
community. In exchange, the Arab world and the international community will
be responsible for implementation of the agreement and the Palestinian
responsibility to meet its obligations.
Assuming that a new paradigm is adopted that includes the four elements, and
assuming that the paradigm will also be based on the agreement that a
Palestinian state must be built gradually and responsibly, based on
milestones and measures of success as well as a meticulous process of
support and guidance led by the international community and the moderate
Arab countries, it may be possible to devise an alternative to the deadlock=
. =
________________________________________
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Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on A=
rab-Israeli relations
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