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Not a parody: proposal of unilateral Israeli withdrawal relying on
Dr. Aaron Lerner – IMRA: Buried inside this article by Kobi Michael we hav=
e =
the following:
“In addition, it seems that to enable the establishment of a viable =
Palestinian state, additional consideration should be given to the =
limitations of the bilateral track and the logic and reconsideration of a =
multilateral regional track, in which especially Jordan and Egypt will =
become full and responsible partners in the process, or alternatively a =
unilateral Israeli measure with the support of the international community.”
That’s right.
After he presents all kinds of requirements for arrangements with the =
Palestinians he turns around and suggest we prepare to retreat (aka =
“unilateral Israeli measure”) in an arrangement that apparently relies on =
Jordan and Egypt.
A suggestion to Kobi Michael and all the others who apparently are so fixed =
on our pulling out of the West Bank come-what-may: follow the news.
In all due respect to Jordan and Egypt, neither of them are in a position =
today that it is a safe bet as to who will be in charge there in another =
decade and what ramifications this will have for Israel.
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Security Arrangements: A 4-Level Game
INSS Insight No. 519, February 20, 2014
Kobi Michael .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=3D4538&articleid=3D6632
SUMARY: In recent weeks, efforts by US Secretary of State Kerry to achieve =
an Israeli-Palestinian framework agreement have focused on an attempt to =
have the parties agree on security arrangements in the Jordan Valley. =
Secretary Kerry apparently presumes that Israel=92s concerns about security =
issues are the main obstacle to progress, and that once Israel=92s concerns =
are met, further progress on the political process toward an agreement will =
be possible. What is troubling about this attitude is its rather =
one-dimensional view of the security question. The US paradigm is military =
in substance, and does not address other aspects, certainly not adequately. =
In fact, it is important to achieve security for Israel through a =
combination of four elements: the military element; the element of =
Palestinian governance and the statehood (political) logic guiding the =
future Palestinian state; the element of regional cooperation; and the =
element of international legitimacy.
In recent weeks, efforts by US Secretary of State Kerry to achieve an =
Israeli-Palestinian framework agreement have focused on an attempt to have =
the parties agree on security arrangements in the Jordan Valley. The major =
issues at hand pertain to the scope of the Israeli military force in the =
region, the duration of its stay, and the nature of its activity. Secretary =
Kerry apparently presumes that Israel=92s concerns about security issues ar=
e =
the main obstacle to progress, and that once Israel=92s concerns are met, =
further progress on the political process toward an agreement will be =
possible. What is troubling about this attitude is its rather =
one-dimensional view of the security question. The US paradigm is military =
in substance, and does not address other aspects, certainly not adequately. =
In fact, it is important to achieve security for Israel through a =
combination of four elements: the military element; the element of =
Palestinian governance and the statehood (political) logic guiding the =
future Palestinian state; the element of regional cooperation; and the =
element of international legitimacy.
Taken together, these four components represent a whole of sorts, with the =
relative weight of each element necessarily derived from the prevailing =
circumstances. The weight of each element can therefore change according to =
the circumstances. Moreover, a system of reciprocal relations exists betwee=
n =
the elements: strengthening and enhancing one element makes it possible to =
change/weaken the importance of another element. Approaching the security =
question as a dynamic combination of elements that interface and exert =
mutual influence creates room for maneuver and flexibility in formulating a=
n =
agreement between the parties and an understanding of the possible changes =
over time. Necessary, then, is an analysis of the issue on four levels. It =
appears that particularly the discussion of Palestinian governance and its =
political theory vis-=E0-vis the adoption of statehood rationale is neglect=
ed =
in the context of security.
From the perspective of Israel=92s interests, a viable Palestinian state th=
at =
takes governmental responsibility and exercises a monopoly on the use of =
force is an essential condition for ensuring stability and security. A =
Palestinian state that falls into the pattern of a failed state is liable t=
o =
become a subversive and hostile entity and develop into a grave security =
threat to Israel. The transition from a sub-state entity with a questionabl=
e =
performance level to a viable, vital, and functioning state can take place =
through a gradual and responsible state building process with the support o=
f =
the international community and Israel.
A viable state is one that exercises effective sovereignty through an =
effective central government free of (violent) subversion and has the =
capacity to:
a. Exercise its authority/impose its sovereignty over the population in =
its area of responsibility Including a monopoly on the use of force while =
complying with the principles of law and order;
b. Supply the needs of the population for which it is responsible, along =
with the population=92s human security;
c. Be acknowledged by the population as the responsible element;
d. Recognize the right of the neighboring countries to exist, respect =
their right to self-determination, and fulfill its responsibility to these =
countries and the international community in a manner that serves and =
supports regional stability and security.
It therefore follows that a viable state is one that effectively and =
consistently exercises sovereignty over its citizens and conducts reciproca=
l =
relations with its neighbors, the region, and the international community =
with responsibility and accountability. An important condition for ensuring =
that a country is viable is its ability to exist independently, which is =
linked to its ability to survive and adapt to a complex and dynamic reality =
as a function of its degree of (in)dependence on external parties =96 the l=
ess =
dependence, the more viability.
The more the Palestinian Authority (PA) resembles a viable state that =
behaves according to political reasoning, the easier it will be for Israel =
to show more flexibility on security arrangements and increase the =
Palestinian areas of responsibility in place of the physical presence of =
Israeli forces. On the other hand, any evidence that the PA is acting in a =
divided and chaotic environment without political reasoning, which first an=
d =
foremost means a monopoly on the use of organized force, or evidence that =
the Palestinian institutional system continues to demonstrate functional =
weakness and that the Palestinian state is unable to act as a viable state, =
means that Israel will be less willing to forego some of its security =
demands or to show more flexibility.
The international community, especially the US, the moderate Arab countries=
, =
and Israel, have an important role in increasing the chances that a viable =
Palestinian state will arise. To this end, the international community =
cannot continue adhering to its familiar format for activity and support fo=
r =
the PA. Rather, targets, milestones, and especially benchmarks for =
performance and success should be defined in a controlled process that =
accompanies and guides the Palestinians.
In addition, it seems that to enable the establishment of a viable =
Palestinian state, additional consideration should be given to the =
limitations of the bilateral track and the logic and reconsideration of a =
multilateral regional track, in which especially Jordan and Egypt will =
become full and responsible partners in the process, or alternatively a =
unilateral Israeli measure with the support of the international community. =
Both alternatives require the greatest possible international legitimacy fo=
r =
Israel, which is precisely the incentive for Israel to cooperate with the =
international community in order to achieve one of two goals: either a =
responsible Palestinian entity acting in accordance with political logic, o=
r =
a unilateral Israeli convergence measure that will make it possible to =
withdraw from territory while maintaining Israel=92s ability to take securi=
ty =
action in the evacuated territories if necessary with broad international =
support.
The distress of the moderate Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and =
Egypt, and their concern about deterioration in the regional theater =
resulting from domestic unrest, the spread of radical Islamic terrorism, th=
e =
escalation of the Sunni-Shiite conflict, and Iran=92s growth as a regional =
power, combined with the perceived weakness of the US as a leading power, =
heightens the common interests of Israel and important countries in the =
region. This time, however, Israel must take advantage of the concern of th=
e =
moderate countries in the Arab world, and taking the initiative, demand =
responsibility from the Arab world in exchange for Israel=92s consent to th=
e =
establishment of a viable Palestinian state. In a certain sense, this is a =
case of historic justice, because the Arab world bears real responsibility =
for the creation of the refugee problem and hence also for solving it.
It appears that Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt can lead the Arab axis and =
take upon themselves the necessary obligations once an agreement is =
achieved. The Arab world will presumably have a more significant and =
restraining influence on the Palestinians, due to their clear interest in =
ensuring regional stability. The main incentive for the success of the =
negotiations should be the strengthening of the regional standing of the =
three leading Arab states and the entire moderate axis, and the weakening o=
f =
Iran=92s regional influence.
Israel=92s willingness to make concessions for an overall regional agreemen=
t =
should be given as a deposit not to the Palestinians, but to the Arab world=
, =
led by the three regional leaders, with guarantees from the international =
community. In exchange, the Arab world and the international community will =
be responsible for implementation of the agreement and the Palestinian =
responsibility to meet its obligations.
Assuming that a new paradigm is adopted that includes the four elements, an=
d =
assuming that the paradigm will also be based on the agreement that a =
Palestinian state must be built gradually and responsibly, based on =
milestones and measures of success as well as a meticulous process of =
support and guidance led by the international community and the moderate =
Arab countries, it may be possible to devise an alternative to the deadlock.
________________________________________
IMRA – Independent Media Review and Analysis
Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on A=
rab-Israeli relations
Website: www.imra.org.il
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Source: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=63270
