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MEMRI: The Prospects For JCPOA Implementation Following The Release Of
MEMRI December 8, 2015 Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.1207
The Prospects For JCPOA Implementation Following The Release Of IAEA Sec-Gen
Amano’s Report On The PMD Of Iran’s Nuclear Program
By: A. Savyon, Y. Carmon, and U. Kafash*
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/8888.htm
Introduction
On December 2, 2015, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
secretary-general Yukiya Amano released his report on the Possible Military
Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program.[1]
The report’s findings, whatever they turned out to be, were not supposed to
impact the continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) in any way – even if they were completely negative regarding
Iran. From the outset, it was agreed that all that Iran was obligated to do
was to cooperate with the IAEA investigation of its PMD, and nothing more.
The next milestone date for the continued implementation of the JCPOA is
December 15, 2015, when Amano’s PMD report will be presented to the IAEA
Board of Governors and the latter will resolve whether to close Iran’s PMD
dossier in the IAEA. This resolution is meant to be adopted by the UN
Security Council.
The implementation process is meant to be continued by Iran – that is, Iran
must meet its obligations under the JCPOA. These consist primarily of the
removal of nine tons of low-grade enriched uranium from the country, the
dismantling of centrifuges so that only 6,000 active ones remain, the
pouring of concrete into the core of the Arak nuclear reactor such that it
will not be able to be used to manufacture plutonium, the adoption of the
Additional Protocol, and more.
After that, the IAEA will check to verify that Iran has carried these out;
when it announces that it has, the next milestone date, Implementation Day,
will come into force. At that time, Europe and the U.S. will carry out their
promise, made October 19, 2015, to lift and suspend their sanctions on Iran.
It was Iran itself that made Amano’s PMD report a problematic issue, and,
essentially, a condition for its continued implementation of the JCPOA. Iran
demanded that the IAEA Board of Governors close its PMD dossier, and,
according to some Iranian spokesmen, it should do so in a way that
completely exonerates Iran of accusations against it regarding development
of a military nuclear program. That is, Iran will not be satisfied with a
closure of the dossier that is merely formal if Amano’s report does not
completely exonerate it.
To this end, in the days leading up to the release of the report, Iran
pressured the IAEA and the P5+1, with the aim of ensuring that the report
would completely clear Iran of suspicions regarding PMD.[2]
In addition to its direct pressure on Amano, Iran also implemented political
pressure on the P5+1, warning that if the dossier remained open, Iran would
not implement its obligations under the JCPOA, and that the West had to
choose between the PMD, that is, accusing Iran of developing a military
nuclear program, and implementing the JCPOA.[3]
The Findings Of Amano’s PMD Report
Iran’s pressure netted only partial success. Prior to the report’s release,
Amano stated: “What I can now say is that this is an issue that cannot be
answered by ‘yes’ and ‘no.’”[4] The report included aspects that were both
positive and negative for Iran.
On the one hand, it stated: “The Agency has not found indications of an
undeclared nuclear fuel cycle in Iran, beyond those activities declared
retrospectively by Iran. The Agency has found no indications of Iran having
conducted activities which can be directly traced to the ‘uranium metal
document’ or to design information for a nuclear explosive device from the
clandestine nuclear supply network.”
However, it also said: “The Agency assesses that explosive bridgewire (EBW)
detonators developed by Iran have characteristics relevant to a nuclear
explosive device.”
With regard to the Parchin facility, Amano’s PMD report stated that “[t]he
information available to the Agency… does not support Iran’s statements on
the purpose of the building.” Furthermore, the report stated that “the
Agency assesses that the extensive activities undertaken by Iran since
February 2012 at the particular location of interest to the Agency seriously
undermined the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification.” It
continued:
“The Agency assesses that Iran conducted computer modelling of a nuclear
explosive device prior to 2004 and between 2005 and 2009. The Agency notes,
however, the incomplete and fragmented nature of those calculations… The
Agency assesses that, before the end of 2003, an organizational structure
was in place in Iran suitable for the coordination of a range of activities
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. Although some
activities took place after 2003, they were not part of a coordinated
effort. The Agency’s overall assessment is that a range of activities
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in
Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities
took place after 2003. The Agency also assesses that these activities did
not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition
of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The Agency has
no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of
a nuclear explosive device after 2009.”[5]
Iran’s Future Moves Vis-à-vis The PMD Dossier In The IAEA Board Of Governors
Assuming that the IAEA Board of Governors follows the Iran-U.S. dictates and
closes Iran’s PMD dossier[6] in spite of the findings mentioned above, it
is not clear that a formal closure of the dossier by the Board of Governors
would satisfy Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, or whether he would block
Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA because the Amano report’s findings do
not exonerate Iran.
The Iranian reactions to the report have been mixed, in accordance with the
speakers’ affiliation with either the pragmatic camp of President Rohani and
Foreign Minister Zarif, or the ideological camp. While the former is willing
to settle for a formal closure of the PMD dossier without Iran’s complete
exoneration,[7] the latter stresses that the reports’ findings determine
that Iran conducted military nuclear development prior to 2009, and see this
as a reason to stop the entire JCPOA process.
The Appendix below presents statements by Deputy Foreign Minister and
negotiator Abbas Aragchi, representing the pragmatic camp, and by Hossein
Shariatmadari, editor of the Iranian daily Kayhan, which is affiliated with
Supreme Leader Khamenei, representing the ideological camp.
It cannot be known whether Khamenei and ideological camp spokesmen will
accept the Board of Governors’ resolution as sufficient. Furthermore, even
if Khamenei decides to accept a closure of the PMD dossier by the Board of
Governors as sufficient, his nine new conditions for Iran’s implementation
of the JCPOA, as set out on October 21, 2015, remain an obstacle to Iran’s
implementation of the JCPOA.[8]
Appendix
Statements By Deputy Foreign Minister Araghchi Immediately After The Release
Of Amano’s PMD Report
On December 2, 2015, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told
Iranian Channel 1: “In the matter of the [Final Assessment] on Past and
Present Outstanding Issues [Regarding Iran's Nuclear Program], the Amano
report states explicitly that all the claims about PMD [refer] strictly to
scientific studies [and not to military development]. This is the most
salient point in the Amano report. The general view of the IAEA vis-à-vis
Past and Present Outstanding Issues in Iran’s nuclear program counters the
claims made against Iran in the past decade.
“The IAEA assessment is that prior to 2003, research activity was carried
out in Iran, not by it. Likewise, there is no sign that nuclear material was
diverted to any initiatives that are not for peaceful purposes.
“The claims in the IAEA report about science and research activity are
unacceptable to us, and we will inform the IAEA of our opinion on this
matter within the allotted time, even though previously Amano said that his
report was not black or white, but in my opinion it leans more towards the
white side, particularly when the conclusion of the report explicitly
rejects [the claim] that there is in Iran a military program, and it is
preparing the ground for the Board of Governors to close the issue of the
PMD dossier.
“The report states that there is no sign of nuclear material in matters that
are not for peaceful purposes, and also that there is no sign of an
undeclared nuclear fuel cycle in Iran. In the matter of equipment [for] dual
use, the IAEA says that in the past Iran worked on detonators, but the
report declares that these detonators had uses for both peaceful and
non-peaceful purposes, and that the IAEA could not make a determination in
this matter…
“Likewise, Iran’s procurements [activities] are not against [the law] and
there is no organization in Iran that was established to produce an atomic
bomb and nuclear weapons. The IAEA pointed out that in the past there was an
organizational structure for this purpose [i.e. to create a nuclear weapon]
and that in Iran’s view this, this organization could have been used for
conventional weapons.
“Nowhere in the IAEA report does it say that Iran conducted dual use
activity, except it is written that dual use activity was carried out in
Iran; nowhere in the report does it accuse the Iranian government of
operating in this direction.
“An additional positive point is that nowhere in the IAEA report is the term
PMD used, since we have never officially recognized this matter and have not
allowed the use of it in official documents or discussions. The JCPOA and
the [IAEA] Road-map likewise do not use this term. In this report, there is
use of [the term] ‘[Final Assessment] on Past and Present Outstanding Issues
[Regarding Iran's Nuclear Program] and there is no use at all of the term
Possible Military Dimensions.
“The IAEA’s claim that in the past there was research concerning military
nuclear activity could be a negative issue. I believe that if the IAEA had
sought the truth, it would not have said such a thing. Additionally, the
IAEA claimed that an explosives firing chamber was constructed at Parchin,
that now does not exist. According to photos from 2000 that we have shown
the IAEA, and on which the IAEA is basing its claims, there was never any
such chamber at such a location. Further, the IAEA visited Parchin twice, in
2004 and 2005, and saw no such thing. We do not confirm this claim, and we
did not want such a summary to appear in the IAEA report.
“All in all, when all the IAEA’s previous claims are placed next to the
[Amano report's] findings, it appears that the report’s fairness leans in
Iran’s favor. The Board of Governors has no excuse to leave this dossier
open…
“Although the IAEA took samples from the Parchin site, it is not declaring
that it found nothing to justify its claims. We expected the IAEA to act
fairly and realistically and not to present these things in the report…
“Amano is not in a position to close the PMD dossier. Amano is a [strictly]
technical element that must report on his assessment according to reality,
facts on the ground, and research that was carried out. The Board of
Governors must resolve whether to close the PMD dossier. In my opinion, with
regard to the report that Amano published, this procedure should be ended,
because there is no proof that Iran’s nuclear program is military, or [was
so] even in the past…
“According to the JCPOA, the P5+1 must submit to the Board of Governors a
draft resolution with the aim of closing the PMD dossier. It does not appear
that the board will decide otherwise in the matter, because the [political]
will is to close [the dossier], and the Amano report provides a reason to do
so.
“Another positive point in the Amano report is its pointing out that the
Road-map was carried out perfectly by Iran. According to it, Iran met all
its obligations.
“Still, the absolute Iranian position is that if this dossier is not closed,
and if even the smallest window remains open [that will allow] a return to
this issue, the JCPOA will not be implemented. We have conveyed this
message, in a serious manner, to the other side, that if the PMD dossier is
not closed [as noted above], we will not carry out our main steps in the
JCPOA. The P5+1 and the Board of Governors must choose one or the other: the
PMD or the JCPOA.
“The IAEA report mentions a prohibition on the use of dual equipment in
illegal matters, particularly nuclear weapons, but there is no prohibition
on the use of dual equipment in ways that are for peaceful purposes or for
conventional weapons. The IAEA has said that EBW [Exploding-Bridgewire
Detonator] and MPI [Multipoint Initiation] are equipment that has a use in
nuclear weapons, Iran has manufactured them and used them. The IAEA says
explicitly that it cannot determine [which] use Iran has made of them. We
have presented the IAEA with documents that show the use of this equipment
in the oil industry and Amano mentioned that Iran has used dual equipment in
matters of peaceful purposes…”[9]
Hossein Shariatmadari In Kayhan Editorial, December 5, 2015
In Kayhan’s December 5, 2015 editorial, Shariatmadari wrote: “On Wednesday,
December 2, the IAEA released its final report on the PMD. In this report,
without presenting any evidence or proof, the IAEA rejects the opinion of
Iran, which Iran has stated many times, and writes that up until 2009 Iran
engaged in a series of activities connected to the production of nuclear
weapons. This is despite the fact that in the past 12 years Iran has
absolutely rejected any deviation [in a military direction] in its civilian
nuclear activity.
“In spite of the extensive and comprehensive visits by IAEA inspectors,
there is no finding to this claim. Several minutes after it was released,
the report was welcomed by the media in the U.S. and in the Zionist regime.
It was said that this report confirms their previous statements against
Iran’s nuclear program, and Iran was accused of lying and cheating for
several years.
“It may be that the IAEA report will have dangerous ramifications, that
should be stated:
“1. It was told [to us] that in the nuclear talks it was agreed that the
IAEA report would be grey, but that the Board of Governors will close [the
matter of the] claim [regarding] the PMD by means of its final resolution.
About this, it must be said that:
“a. If this is a matter of an official agreement, where is this mentioned
in the JCPOA? The answer is: Nowhere.
“b. And if this was an oral agreement, how can the oral agreements of the
rival be trusted when it has violated and continues to violate its formal
obligations?!
“c. It was told [to us] that the IAEA report would be grey – that is,
with black and white points, positive and negative. Contrary to the opinion
of our dear brother Dr. Araghchi, not only does this report not lean more
towards white, but most of its sections are black. Additionally, the white
points that the members [of the negotiating team] mention have only a white
exterior, and their essence is completely black; we will address this later
on.
“2. The report states that up to 2009, Iran engaged in research and
development connected to [nuclear] weapons – that is, the part of the report
that addresses Iran’s nuclear challenge, which has continued for 12 years,
is decided in favor of the rival. This is because in the past 12 years, the
U.S. and its allies, and after that the P5+1, accused Iran of deviating in
its nuclear program in the direction of nuclear weapons… Ultimately, the
IAEA carried out more extensive oversight activity than [that required] in
the Additional Protocol, and found no document attesting that Iran’s nuclear
activity was not civilian. [Our] technical and judicial expectation was that
the report would reject the claims that Iran had deviated in its nuclear
program or at the very least that it would be stated [in it] that it had
found no sign of such a deviation. But the report confirms the groundless
and evidence-free claim of the U.S. and its allies.
“3. Our friends [on the negotiating team] say that the general view of the
report shows that its conclusion contradicts all the claims and talk against
Iran’s nuclear program in the past 12 years… For 12 years [the U.S. and
its allies] have claimed that Iran’s nuclear program is not civilian and is
advancing in the direction of nuclear weapons. The IAEA report justifies
this claim. How, then, can it be said that ‘the report contradicts the
claims [against Iran] in the past 12 years!?’
“4. The U.S. and its allies accused Iran, without presenting any proof,
that up until 2009 it made efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. Now, the
report justifies the claims and accuses Iran of lying, cheating, concealing,
breaking the law, and more. Those responsible for the nuclear negotiations
must be asked: Was this the intention of the ‘acquisition of international
confidence for Iran’ that you talked so much about? Take a quick look at the
statements by American, European, and Zionist elements, and at the
commentary and analysis by the foreign media, that were published
immediately after the report was released: U.S. Secretary of State John
Kerry says proudly that everything we [the U.S.] said about Iran’s nuclear
program was true.[10] He stresses that we [the U.S.] had never had any
doubts that Iran had striven to attain nuclear weapons.[11] Reuters
rejected Iran’s statements that we had never wanted nuclear weapons, and
wrote, with a large headline: ‘Iran had ‘coordinated effort’ relevant to
atom bombs – IAEA.’ USA Today accuses Iran of lying about its non-civilian
nuclear activity up to 2009. The Times of Israel spoke respectfully of the
opinion of Israeli experts that from the outset, they had said that Iran was
making efforts to create nuclear weapons, and more.
“5. The first article of the [IAEA] report states that it is ‘based on
information available to the IAEA… [The points in the original report]
include information obtained by the IAEA from Iran in the Framework for
Cooperation, including the Road-map and the JCPOA.’ This article says, or at
least can be interpreted as saying, that even the elements in Iran (as the
IAEA supposes) agreed that up to 2009 Iran engaged in non-civilian [nuclear]
activity. Now, tell me: What is white in this report [as Araghchi said], and
what in it arouses pride?!
“6. The IAEA report on the PMD is a final report, and the IAEA saw no need
to continue to investigate. Perhaps there will be those who will see this as
a white point, and as a point in [Iran's] favor. But in effect, the IAEA is
stating absolutely that Iran made efforts to attain nuclear weapons, and
that there is no need to reexamine this. That is, the ground has been
prepared for future exploitation [of this claim against Iran].
“7. The report justifies the suspicion of the U.S. and its allies
regarding Iran’s nuclear activity and their perception of it non-civilian.
Therefore, this justifies grave restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activity, as
well as unprecedented oversight on it. If we accept this report, we will
destroy [with our own hands] all our achievements gained through great
effort and sacrifices in blood.
“8. The IAEA report could be more dangerous than the JCPOA, because it is
an international document that proves that the opinions and proof that Iran
submitted concerning its non-civilian nuclear program are unrealistic and
unreliable. Therefore, the U.S. can extend the implementation of the JCPOA
from 15 years to 25 years, or even for eternity, on the pretext that the
IAEA report shows that you [i.e. Iran] have lied for 12 years about your
nuclear program and there is guarantee that you will not want to produce
nuclear weapons under your civilian program.
“9. If Iran accepts the IAEA report, as unfortunately is becoming clear
from statements by certain elements, the document will gain international
[validity], and even if the Board of Governors closes the PMD dossier, this
document [i.e. the report] is sufficient in order to permanently restrict
our nuclear program and to leave Iran’s nuclear activity in the laboratory
and as pilot [project]. That is, on the level of ‘nothing.’ Not for nothing
have the rival’s media published the report enthusiastically and applauded
the IAEA and its secretary-general.
“10. With regard to the U.S.’s long list of broken promises and deception in
the past 12 years of [Iran's] nuclear challenge, it can be said fervently
that even if we assume that the Board of Governors closes the PMD dossier,
as the friends [in the negotiating team] say it has promised, the IAEA’s
final report can serve as a good basis for future extortion and excessive
demands on the part of the U.S…
“11. In conclusion, the defense of [Iran's] national and scientific
interests requires that the elements connected to the nuclear [issue] in
Iran show strength and might and explicitly oppose the report and [demand
that it be considered] an illegal report and not a technical report [that
is, that it be considered a political report] lacking all findings and
proof.”[12]
*A. Savyon is Director of the MEMRI Iran Media Project; Y. Carmon is
President of MEMRI; U. Kafash is a Research Fellow at MEMRI.
Endnotes:
[1] Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s
Nuclear Programme,
Isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_PMD_Assessment_2Dec2015.pdf.
[2] Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said: “In the coming
days, our experts will be in touch with IAEA experts, and if necessary, they
will raise further points. It is even possible that I will meet with Amano
again… According to what we were told, there are some weak points in the
IAEA report, on which I have commented. I am optimistic that they will be
amended. I have provided necessary comments to the Americans and Europeans.”
ISNA (Iran), November 25, 2015. On November 29, 2015, he said: “We expect
[IAEA secretary-general] Amano to present the Board of Governors with a
realistic and moderate report. It is true that it is not possible to
determine absolutely what happened 10-15 years ago, and there are various
possibilities. We do not expect that Amano will present an absolute
report… In any event, the resolution [about closing the PMD dossier]
lies with the Board of Governors [and not with Amano]. Our criterion is the
closure of the PMD dossier in the Board of Governors. We are waiting for its
resolution.” Mehr. Iran, November 29, 2015. Also see MEMRI Special Dispatch
No. 6229, Statements By Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi
Indicate: IAEA’s PMD Report Is Being Written In Negotiation With Iran, Not
Independently, November 27, 2015.
[3] Aragchi said on November 29, 2015: “We are now in consultation on the
content of the draft resolution that the P5+1 is meant to present to the
Board of Governors. In the content [of the draft resolution], they must use
terms that mean closure and conclusion of the PMD dossier in the Board of
Governors. If this dossier is not closed, our position is absolutely clear –
this dossier must be closed, so that we implement the JCPOA. If not, we will
not implement our obligations, that according to the JCPOA Iran must
implement after the closure of the PMD dossier. That is, the JCPOA will not
be implemented fully. Mehr (Iran), November 29, 2015. Araghchi added, “If
Yukiya Amano or the Board of Governors present their report in such a way
that it does not meet the obligations that were given, Iran too will stop
[implementing] the JCPOA.” Press TV, Iran, November 26, 2015. Also, at a
November 26, 2015 press conference, Foreign Minister Zarif said: “The Amano
report, in the coming days, will help close the dossier permanently. If the
report is realistic enough, Iran will move in the direction envisioned for
it in the past [that is, it will implement the JCPOA].”The PMD is
encapsulated, though we believe undeservedly, as ‘concerns past and present’
in the text of the JCPOA; we hope Amano’s report within upcoming days will
help close the case forever. If the report is realistic enough, Iran will
move in the direction predicted for it before.” Mehr (Iran), November 26,
2015. Also see similar statements by Supreme National Security Council
secretary Ali Shamkhani, ISNA, Iran, November 29, 2015. Additionally, on
December 1, 2015, the daily Etemaad, which is affiliated with pragmatic camp
leader Hashemi Rafsanjani, stated that the negotiating team had said clearly
that the West must choose between the PMD and the JCPOA.
[4] Reuters, November 26, 2015.
[5] Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s
Nuclear Programme.
Isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_PMD_Assessment_2Dec2015.pdf.
[6] A hint at this could be found in the December 5, 2015 editorial of the
Iranian daily Kayhan, in which the paper’s editor, Hossein Shariatmadari,
wrote: “It was told [to us] that in the nuclear talks it was agreed that the
IAEA report would be grey, but that the Board of Governors will close [the
matter of the] claim [regarding] the PMD by means of its final resolution”
(see Appendix for the full editorial). Also, Araghchi’s November 26, 2015
statements to Iran’s Press TV hinted at commitments to Iran in this vein:
“If Yukiya Amano or the Board of Governors present their report in such a
way that it does not meet the obligations that were given, Iran too will
stop [implementing] the JCPOA.”
[7] Although the members of the negotiating team also claimed that the
Amano report contains statements that are unacceptable. Following the
report’s release, Araghchi said in a December 2, 2015 television interview:
“The claims in the IAEA report about science and research activity are
unacceptable to us, and we will inform the IAEA of our opinion on this
matter within the allotted time… The IAEA’s claim that in the past there
was research concerning military nuclear activity could be a negative issue.
I believe that if the IAEA had sought the truth, it would not have said such
a thing. Additionally, the IAEA claimed that an explosives firing chamber
was constructed at Parchin, that now does not exist. According to photos
from 2000 that we have shown the IAEA, and on which the IAEA is basing its
claims, there was never any such chamber at such a location. Further, the
IAEA visited Parchin twice, in 2004 and 2005, and saw no such thing. We do
not confirm this claim, and we did not want such a summary to appear in the
IAEA report” (for the full statements, see Appendix). ISNA, Iran, December
2, 2015. See also statements by Atomic Energy Organization of Iran director
Ali Akbar Salehi: “Based on the Amano report, there remains no way to leave
the PMD dossier open… Based on this [report], and on my extensive
experience in the IAEA, the PMD dossier will be closed for certain, because
they have not succeeded in presenting any document. Therefore, this false
dossier that has entangled us for many years will be closed permanently.”
Nasimonline, Iran, December 3, 2015.
[8] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 1196, Iranian Supreme
Leader Khamenei’s Letter Of Guidelines To President Rohani On JCPOA Sets
Nine Conditions Nullifying Original Agreement Announced July 14, 2015,
October 22, 2015.
[9] ISNA (Iran), December 2, 2015.
[10] MEMRI did not find Kerry’s exact words in this regard.
[11] Kerry said at a December 4, 2015 press conference that “nobody has had
any doubts whatsoever about Iran’s past military endeavors.”
State.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/12/250362.htm.
[12] Kayhan (Iran), December 5, 2015.
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