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The Elections in Iran: A Show of Support for the Rouhani Route
The Elections in Iran: A Show of Support for the Rouhani Route
INSS Insight No. 801, March 2, 2016
SUMMARY: The results of the February 26, 2016 elections for the Iranian
Majlis and Assembly of Experts was a first test of the leadership of
President Hassan Rouhani since the signing of the JCPOA between Iran and the
P5+1 and the subsequent lifting of sanctions. The results indicate a
significant change, with the (relatively) moderate camp successfully
challenging the power of the extremist conservatives. With regard to Israel,
the major question remains whether the moderate camp’s electoral success
under Rouhani’s leadership will lead to a change in Iran’s regional policy.
However, prospects for this are extremely slim, because the most influential
element in this arena is the Revolutionary Guard, which is deeply involved
in the fighting in Syria and Iraq, responsible for relations with Hezbollah,
and involved in the provision of aid to the Houthis in Yemen. The extremist
conservatives have no intention of changing their views on foreign policy,
which seeks to strengthen Iran’s regional influence.
.+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++light of the high voter
turnout – which stood at approximately 60 percent, higher than the turnout
in the last elections – the authorities were compelled to keep the polls
open for a few hours after their scheduled closing times.
A picture of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani casting his vote at a polling
station in Tehran, February 26, 2016. Photo: AFP / HO / Iranian Presidency
The element of “choice” in elections in Iran differs from the concept
familiar to the West. Of the thousands of registered candidates, only those
who successfully passed the vetting process of the Guardian Council (12
clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader) were permitted to run. The
wide-scale disqualification during the approval process sparked a bitter
public confrontation in Iran, led personally by Rouhani and his patron Ali
Rafsanjani. This in turn forced the Guardian Council of the Constitution to
reexamine the disqualifications and approve some of the disqualified
candidates.
Even if the division of political groupings in Iran into conservatives,
moderates, and reformists does not precisely reflect the personal
characteristics of their members and has been ridiculed by the Supreme
Leader, it nonetheless distinguishes between two major blocs within the
Iranian political arena: the camp that endorses the policy led by Rouhani,
with the public support of Rafsanjani, and the more extreme camp, led by the
Revolutionary Guard with the partial support of the Supreme Leader. The two
camps remain divided on a number of fundamental issues, from their attitude
toward the nuclear agreement, to their attitude toward the United States, to
the main elements of the economic policy that the state should pursue.
The election results indicate a significant change in the balance of power
within the two particular institutions. The Assembly of Experts, which
consists of 88 members elected for a term of eight years, is the body
authorized to choose the Supreme Leader’s successor when the time comes.
According to the surprising results, Rafsanjani, in first place, leads the
list, with more than fifty percent of the members of the Assembly belonging
to the moderate camp, which thus succeeded in significantly reducing the
power of the extremist conservatives who had previously controlled the body.
Moderates also won more than half of the 290 seats in the Majlis, the
Iranian parliament, whose major powers include approving the appointment of
ministers and the state budget, and the ability to summon the President and
his ministers for hearings and hold votes of no-confidence in them.
As he promised the public on the eve of the 2013 elections, President
Rouhani regards the nuclear agreement as of the utmost importance for
lifting the sanctions and opening Iran to foreign investment. This worldview
is not the product of sympathies for the West or a fondness of Western
culture, but is rather an accurate reading of Iran’s economic situation and
its impact on the public, particularly the younger generation, which has
been the chief casualty of the country’s high unemployment rate, inflation,
and international isolation. The extremist conservative camp, on the other
hand, opposed what it sees as the concessions Iran accepted as part of the
nuclear agreement. Today, this camp is increasingly concerned by the
possibility that economic openness to the West could also lead to cultural
penetration, which would have a particularly strong impact on the young
generation and ultimately lead to a change in Iran’s revolutionary
character. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who holds similar views, has
repeatedly emphasized the need to protect the country from Western
influence, and continues to classify the United States as the principal
enemy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Against this background, the recent elections were a vote of confidence for
the policy of President Rouhani, with the results a clear statement by the
young generation, which accounts for more than 60 percent of the Iranian
electorate, of a desire to provide the President with the political tools he
needs to make good on his electoral promise of “a better future.” In order
to fulfill his promises, Rouhani is in need of a more moderate parliament
that will enable him to move forward with the economic measures he plans to
implement, which include reducing the Revolutionary Guard’s role in the
economy, fighting the corruption that has assumed troubling dimensions in
the country, and encouraging the foreign investment so desperately needed by
the Iranian economy.
With regard to Israel, the major question remains whether the moderate camp’s
electoral success under Rouhani’s leadership will lead to a change in Iran’s
regional policy. The most influential element in this arena is the
Revolutionary Guard, which is deeply involved in the fighting in Syria,
responsible for relations with Hezbollah, and involved in the fighting in
Iraq and the provision of aid to the Houthis in Yemen. President Rouhani has
thus far not been greatly involved in these areas, and it is highly
questionable whether he will be able to translate his increased strength in
the internal Iranian arena into greater involvement in regional policy. One
of the achievements that the West in general and the United States in
particular had hoped to secure from the nuclear agreement was Iran’s
integration into the region as a positive actor that would contribute to its
stability, due especially to its central role in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and
Lebanon. Significantly, however, the Supreme Leader directed the negotiating
team on the nuclear issue to refrain from engaging in dialogue on regional
issues. He continues to support the positions of the Revolutionary Guard and
the extremist conservatives in the political arena, who seek to increase
Iranian power in the region in a manner that will help further what they
regard as Iran’s foremost interest: reducing and ultimately terminating
America’s influence and presence in the region.
That being the case, no changes in Iranian regional policy can be expected
in the short term, as reflected in the statement by Iran’s ambassador to
Lebanon regarding the provision of financial support to the families of
Palestinian terrorists and families whose homes have been demolished. From
Israel’s perspective, there is little difference between the positions of
Iran’s radical camp toward Israel and those of the camp that is classified
as “moderate.” Indeed, it was Rafsanjani himself who hinted that one nuclear
bomb would be enough to destroy Israel. Still, in the medium and long terms,
if Rouhani succeeds in promoting his economic agenda and openness to the
West, which he regards as essential to an improvement in the country’s
economic situation, Israel may be able to ask its allies in the West to use
their influence to tone down Iran’s positions on the Israeli issue.
Overall, the pragmatic moderate-conservative camp in Iran secured an
extremely impressive and significant electoral achievement in two ruling
bodies. In the years to come, the Assembly of Experts will most likely be
the body that decides who will be the country’s next leader, and its
moderate majority will seek to select a leader that reflects its views. As a
religious figure, Rouhani may regard himself as a suitable candidate for the
position of Supreme Leader when the time comes. In the Majlis, the
parliamentary majority secured by the moderate camp will enable it to
advance its economic policy, guided by the goal of moving Iran down a path
of development and progress after many years of sanctions that inflicted
significant damage on the country.
The elections, however, should not be viewed as the final word in the
political struggle between the major forces of power in Iran, which has yet
to be decided. On the one hand, the electoral victory, along with the
nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions, has strengthened Rouhani’s
position in the upcoming presidential elections, which will be held next
year. On the other hand, other difficult political struggles await him
vis-à-vis the extremist conservatives, who have no intention of giving up
their positions of power in the economic arena or their views on foreign
policy and ideology, and who will seek to challenge him in the realms in
which they still enjoy strong influence, with an emphasis on the regional
arena – where they constitute the most central and influential element.
Source: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=70115
