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Iran: Naval Bases in Syria and in Yemen?
Iran: Naval Bases in Syria and in Yemen?
INSS Insight No. 879, December 21, 2016
Ephraim Kam .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=12690
SUMMARY: In late November 2016, the Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed
forces announced to commanders of the Iranian fleet that Iran may establish
naval bases in the future far from its shores, on islands or as floating
bases, and that one day it may be possible to have bases on the shores of
Yemen or Syria. These remarks reflect Iran’s fundamental hegemonic
aspirations in the Middle East and, in some respects, beyond. In concrete
terms, Iran is translating its hegemonic aspirations into efforts to
establish its centrality as a regional power. At this stage, Israel would do
well to monitor the developments in this regard, though it is not at all
clear whether the bases will materialize, and if they do, when and in what
form. Therefore, the extent of their threat to Israel and other countries is
unclear. The establishment of the naval bases relatively close to Israel
gives Israel a more convenient possibility of destroying them if necessary,
for example, in retaliation for an Iranian provocation. At the same time,
any military operation against an Iranian naval base in Syria – whether
overt or covert – is liable to trigger an Iranian response – directly, or
through Hezbollah.
In late November 2016, the Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces,
General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, announced to commanders of the Iranian
fleet that Iran may establish naval bases in the future far from its shores,
on islands or as floating bases, and that one day it may be possible to have
bases on the shores of Yemen or Syria. Baqeri emphasized that expanding the
current range of the Iranian naval presence is meant to demonstrate power,
strengthen deterrence, and force potential enemies to refrain from entering
Iranian waters. He stressed that Iran likewise needs a fleet of ships to
protect its interests in the Indian Ocean, similar to its fleet in the Gulf.
Iranian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari added that Iran has
plans to expand its naval presence in international waters, and that a
flotilla of two battleships is now circumnavigating the African continent en
route to the Atlantic Ocean in order to demonstrate the power of the Iranian
fleet. Iran is also proposing an exchange of visits and joint naval
exercises with countries along the coasts of Africa and the Indian Ocean.
The remarks by the Iranian commanders derive primarily from Iran’s
fundamental hegemonic aspirations in the Middle East and, in some respects,
beyond. The drive toward regional hegemony has been a key target in the
Iranian strategy since the days of the Shah, but the current regime has
added an Islamic-religious layer to the strategy. Its objective is not
necessarily territorial expansion, but rather, to bring about a change in
the geostrategic conditions in the region and impact on key processes, while
improving Iran’s positioning and minimizing the external threats to its
security. Iran’s aim is to spur the regional elements and global powers to
take its spheres of interest into consideration. This aspiration is based on
its imperialistic history, the sheer size of its population and territory,
its religious importance, and its cultural heritage.
In concrete terms, Iran is translating its hegemonic aspirations into
efforts to establish its centrality as a regional power and to reduce United
States regional involvement, because to the Iranian regime, the principal
threat is posed by the United States. Concurrently, it is taking action to
intervene and influence other countries in the region with military and
economic means and through affiliated Shiite organizations, in order to
contend with the threats that have emerged as a result of the regional
upheaval, and take advantage of the opportunities to promote interests in
the region.
The Iranian naval fleet plays an important role in Tehran’s efforts to
achieve regional hegemony, while protecting Iran’s long coastline in the
Gulf and its interests in the Caspian Sea. The fleet’s principal role is to
protect Iran’s oil assets, which for the most part are located in the Gulf,
and to deter its rivals – led by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and,
formerly, Iraq – since most of their threats to Iran are focused in the Gulf
area. In addition, the Iranian fleet serves as Iran’s long arm for security
and deterrence purposes – first and foremost, in the vicinity of the Gulf
and the Indian Ocean. Now the heads of the Iranian military have begun to
announce publicly that they are also expanding the influence of the Iranian
fleet beyond the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, even toward the Atlantic
Ocean.
Although the Iranian naval fleet still uses partially outdated equipment, it
poses a significant threat to its rivals in the Gulf region, due to its
rocket and mine-laying capabilities and due to Iran’s complete control over
the entire length of the eastern shore of the Gulf. The fleet’s two units –
the Iranian mainline fleet and the fleet of the Revolutionary Guard –
include three submarines, two corvettes, four guided-missile frigates,
dozens of rocket vessels and rocket-bearing patrol boats, 15 midget
submarines, some of which were manufactured in Iran, and additional types of
vessels. The Iranian fleet is also developing and manufacturing additional
types of vessels, and is constructing additional naval bases in the Gulf.
The prevailing assessment is that the Iranian fleet is incapable of blocking
navigation in the Gulf over an extended period, due to United States
capabilities in breaking through any Iranian obstacle, but Iran is capable
of disrupting marine traffic in the Gulf with rockets, mines, and
shore-to-ship artillery fire.
The salient point in the Iranian Chief of Staff’s remarks is his
unprecedented comment about the possibility of establishing Iranian naval
bases in Syria and in Yemen. Not clear is whether the step has already been
agreed on with Syria and Yemen and is about to be launched. It appears from
the general tone of his remarks that at issue is a statement of intentions,
which perhaps have already been discussed with Syria and Yemen – and perhaps
also with Russia – but his choice of words, that “it may become possible one
day,” could imply that this is still a remote possibility that has not yet
been agreed upon with the two countries. The timing of these remarks is also
not clear, but presumably there are two factors: One, Iran already began
sending vessels toward the Atlantic Ocean. Clearly this is a tactic mainly
serving its internal and external propaganda needs, without any tangible
substance. Perhaps Iran is floating the idea of naval bases to create the
impression that this is a comprehensive strategic course of action, in order
to check the reactions to its announcement about the construction of naval
bases in Syria and in Yemen. Two, the remarks perhaps were intended to
counterbalance recent news about Israel’s purchase of modern submarines. Or,
Iran’s announcement may serve as a trial balloon that it intends to set up
permanent shop in two countries with shaky regimes, in order to ensure
continuity of influence in the event that these regimes collapse, while
collecting a price in exchange for the considerable assistance it supplies
them.
If in the final analysis Iran succeeds in establishing naval bases on the
shores of Syria and Yemen, this will have troubling implications, mainly for
Israel, Saudi Arabia ,and the United States, and for Egypt and Turkey. It is
unclear whether Iran is thinking in terms of establishing a permanent base –
as per the Chief of Staff’s remarks – or whether at issue is a temporary and
limited presence and the receipt of port services. The worst-case scenario
is the construction of a permanent base in Syria, which connotes a permanent
naval arm in the Mediterranean Sea and an Iranian military presence in
proximity to Israel, while creating a threat and establishing deterrence
against Israel. Moreover, the establishment of a naval base in Syria will
enable Iran to transport regular supplies and other assistance to Hezbollah,
without being dependent upon overland convoys or aerial transport through
Syria, Iraq, and/or Turkey, and will serve its intelligence collection
needs. The establishment of a naval base in Yemen will exacerbate the
Iranian threat from the south against Saudi Arabia, and will provide Iran
with the ability to pose a threat at the entrance to the Red Sea, and a
capacity to affect the navigation of ships towards the Suez Canal and the
Gulf of Eilat in the event of a confrontation.
Nevertheless, Iran presumably recognizes that the establishment of naval
bases so far from its shores, when its ability to defend them is
problematic, exposes these bases to strikes from its rivals, mainly in the
event of a confrontation. This consideration may restrain Iran from hurrying
to establish the naval bases, before it finds a solution to such threats.
At this stage, Israel would do well to monitor the developments in this
regard, because it is not at all clear whether the bases will materialize,
and if they do, when and in what form. Therefore, the extent of their threat
to Israel and other countries is unclear. Insofar as it will become evident
that the establishment of the naval bases creates substantial threats, then
it will be necessary to examine to what extent the United States intends to
take action in this regard, since such threats also concern the United
States and its allies. The establishment of the naval bases relatively close
to Israel gives Israel a more convenient possibility of destroying them if
necessary, for example, in retaliation for an Iranian provocation. At the
same time, any military operation against an Iranian naval base in Syria –
whether overt or covert – is liable to trigger an Iranian response –
directly, or through Hezbollah.
Source: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=71915
