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=?UTF-8?Q?Chemical_Weapons_in_Syria=2C_Iraq_?=
Chemical Weapons in Syria, Iraq and Beyond: Assessment and Implications
By Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, December 12, 2016
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 386
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Chemical weapons (CW) continue to be employed frequently
in Syria and Iraq. While the scale of attacks has been relatively minor so
far, the possibility remains that the Islamic State (IS) might attempt a
high-impact WMD attack. Hezbollah, too, which is present in both Syria and
Lebanon, might wish to be – or indeed, already may be – equipped with CW.
The partial dismantling of the Syrian chemical weapons arsenal has had
little effect on the regularity with which such weapons have been deployed
in Syria and Iraq. They have been used by the Assad regime, the rebels, and
IS alike. Another military element currently based in both Syria and
Lebanon – Hezbollah – might also be interested in obtaining, or might
already have obtained, CW.
In August 2013, the Syrian regime killed approximately 1,300 people with
sarin nerve gas. This action was punished by a demand for Syrian chemical
disarmament. The regime, which held onto a concealed store of standard
military CW (possibly amounting to up to 100 tons, including CW precursors),
refrained for the most part from employing them.
But that is not to say that the regime desisted from using chemicals against
its opponents, or that it was it the only party to do so. Weaponized
industrial toxic chemicals, mainly chlorine, became a routine weapon for all
warring factions including the rebels and IS; and while this form of attack
violates international laws and conventions, it has elicited only muted
international condemnation, hence its repeated use in both Syria and Iraq,
albeit on a minor scale.
Although CW have not brought about a major shift in the course of warfare,
they have not been ineffective, offering their users a series of
accumulating net benefits, notably intimidating survivors into flight.
(Retaliation has also been an excuse for the deployment of CW by all three
actors, but does not appear to be a main incentive.)
It is possible that IS will attempt an act of “mega-sabotage,” meaning a
high-impact operation involving CW or another WMD. The organization is very
much inclined to pursue such an operation, either in the Middle East or in
Europe or the US. Its weakened condition suggests that it is unlikely to
pull off such an attack – but its motivation to attempt one is undoubtedly
growing.
Of the three actors, IS is the most troublesome. IS has been dented by a
variety of adversaries over the past year, but has retained its relatively
rudimentary CW capacities. It endeavored to upgrade those capacities
considerably by converting a pharmaceutical factory near Mosul into a
production center for the manufacture of mustard gas. All the precursors
were at hand from the oil industry, as were the necessary experts.
This orderly effort was curtailed, however. In February 2016, US special
forces captured the purported head of IS’s CW program, an Iraqi named
Sleiman Daoud al-Afari, in Badoosh, northwest of Mosul. In September, the US
bombarded the CW production facility. This attenuated, but did not paralyze,
IS’s CW program. The organization has also tried to procure biological and
radiological weapons, with no clear outcome as yet.
Optimists might postulate that what IS has not yet obtained, in terms of WMD
capabilities, it will not obtain. This is plausible, if unlikely. Estimates
made in the lead-up to the Mosul coalition offensive were that IS had
evacuated most of its CW-related equipment and experts to Syria.
An independent analysis by the IHS Conflict Monitor, a London-based
intelligence collection and analysis service, states that as of November
2016, IS had used CW at least 52 times across Syria and Iraq since it swept
to power in 2014. The wide distribution of these attacks indicates
appreciable CW deployability and conveyability. The attacks were
geographically scattered and varied in their delivery systems, suggesting
that IS modified or obtained, and was experimenting with, different types of
rockets and shells configured to carry toxic chemicals.
CW have been used repeatedly during the lingering fight over Aleppo. In
Iraq, during the contemporaneous fighting over Mosul, IS fired artillery
shells and rockets equipped with mustard agents at the Qayyarah air base, a
key installation where US and Iraqi troops operate. IS also adopted a mode
of induced dispersal of toxic chemicals by exploding civilian chemical
facilities (for example, a major civilian chemical factory at Mishraq that
contained large quantities of sulfuric compounds).
IS’s motivation to achieve a relatively high-impact WMD operation in Syria,
Iraq or beyond, against either military forces or civilian targets, is
growing as the group becomes increasingly incapacitated. The possibility of
a high-impact chemical, biological or radiological attack still exists and
should not be discounted. (Nuclear weaponry, which is unobtainable for IS,
is irrelevant within this context.)
Beyond the Middle East, the US and Europe are IS’s main targets. In February
2016, the Director of US National Intelligence warned that IS “would like to
use CW” in an attack on America. Also, the Dutch counterterrorism
coordinator noted that IS is estimated to have between 60 and 80 operatives
planted in Europe to carry out attacks. A similar order of magnitude might
be inferred in the US. Whether these operatives are capable of committing
acts of WMD sabotage is not clear.
Israel, too, has reason to be concerned about IS attempts at CW attacks.
Militants of IS or its affiliates in the Golan Heights (“Shuhada al-Yarmouk”,
or the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade) have confronted the IDF very little, but
there is unverified – though concrete – information in the Israeli media
pointing to the group’s possession of CW. IDF Chief-of-Staff Gadi Eizenkot
has mentioned the worrying possibility that various rivals in Syria might
employ CW.
Minister of Defense Avigdor Lieberman has stressed that Israel will act
without restraint to prevent the transfer of WMD (and advanced conventional
weapon systems) from Syria to Hezbollah. This emphasis is understandable, as
any conjunction of Hezbollah with CW is intolerable to Israel. In principle,
equipping Hezbollah with CW or BW by Iran – known to be in possession of
such arsenals – is no less likely than by Syria.
Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, a microbiologist and an expert on chemical
and biological warfare in the Middle East, is a senior research associate at
the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He is a former senior
intelligence analyst in the IDF and the Israeli Defense Ministry.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the
Greg Rosshandler Family
Source: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=71859
