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Slowly but Surely: Growing Relations between Saudi Arabia and China
Slowly but Surely: Growing Relations between Saudi Arabia and China
INSS Insight No. 891, January 29, 2017
Yoel Guzansky, Assaf Orion
SUMMARY: From China’s perspective, enhanced relations with the Saudi kingdom
address a variety of interests. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, China
constitutes a stable and reliable strategic partner that complements the
kingdom’s strategic relations with the United States, mainly on economic and
political dimensions, and without the unpleasant Western criticism on issues
relating to human rights and democratization. Thus, both countries are
finding a common comfort zone in mutual respect of their sovereignties
without trying to change each other. There may be potential to promote
common topics of interest in the China-Saudi Arabia-Israel triangle as long
as they are of low visibility and of sufficient deniability. Considering
that China has proven advantages in developing economic infrastructure,
while Saudi Arabia can and wants to have an economic-strategic impact on the
region, Israel would do well to continue striving to tap the potential in
the partnership between them to stabilize its strategic environment, with an
emphasis on those countries that are at peace with Israel – Egypt and
Jordan – as well as the Palestinian arena.
On October 27, 2016, a joint anti-terrorism exercise was completed in China,
with dozens of combatants from the Chinese and Saudi Arabian special forces
participating. The exercise, the first of its kind, invites an examination
of trends in China-Saudi relations as part of the network of ties between
world powers and leading Middle East states.
From China’s perspective, enhanced relations with the Saudi kingdom address
a variety of interests, including: promoting security and energy interests
and boosting its economy; balancing its strategic posture, which is heavily
based in East Asia, by turning westward; improving its internal stability in
western China by striving to stabilize the near periphery in central Asia
and the distant periphery in the Middle East; alleviating the domestic
threats of radical Islam (posed particularly by the Uyghur minority in the
Xinjiang region) and minimizing the external criticism of China’s treatment
of its Muslim citizens; and finally, recognition of its standing as a global
power, while increasing its involvement in an asset-rich region.
From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, China constitutes a stable and reliable
strategic partner that complements the kingdom’s strategic relations with
the United States, mainly on economic and political dimensions, and without
the unpleasant Western criticism on issues relating to human rights and
democratization. Therefore, both countries are finding a common comfort zone
in mutual respect of their sovereignties without trying to change each
other: they are both concerned about the challenges to their internal
stability posed by the upheavals in the Middle East; both are seeking
stability and security in the Middle East and a safe flow of energy; and
they both recognize a zone of common interest in economic development while
safeguarding governmental order.
The regimes manage the bilateral relations while maneuvering impressively
between areas of contention and while finding points of delicate balance for
mitigating possible tensions. China successfully implements its traditional
Middle Eastern policy (“getting along with everyone”), conducting parallel
but separate relationships with Iran and with Tehran’s sworn enemies, Saudi
Arabia and Israel. China’s support for Russia and the Assad regime in Syria
is diametrically opposed to Saudi positions; Beijing has also called for an
end to the fighting in Yemen, while avoiding substantive criticism of the
kingdom’s fighting there. For its part, Saudi Arabia has deepened its
economic relations with China, without damaging its trade relations with the
United States, let alone its security and political relations with
Washington. To a great extent, this maneuvering was successful because China
has consistently refrained from explicit declaration of a concrete regional
policy, from taking clear sides on points of contention or expressly
supporting sides to conflicts, and from public wrangling this within the
scope of a policy replete with internal contradictions that coexist
harmoniously in ambiguity.
A recent study by the Rand Institute defined China and its involvement in
the Middle East as “an economic heavyweight, a political lightweight, and a
military featherweight.” This pattern of involvement is also evident in its
relations with Saudi Arabia, with its lion’s share in the economic sphere
(according to data from the UN Comtrade database, bilateral trade totaled
about $51 billion in 2015 and about $21 billion during the first half of
2016), focusing on energy. While oil exports from Saudi Arabia to the United
States have diminished gradually, due to increased US oil shale production,
China, the largest oil importer in the world, has become Saudi Arabia’s
principal customer. Saudi Arabia is now seeking to sustain its dominance in
the Chinese energy market in the face of intensifying competition, mainly on
the part of Iran and Russia. To this end, and to help stabilize the supply,
Saudi Arabia is operating in China through investments and the establishment
of oil refineries and strategic stockpiling facilities for Saudi oil in
China. Furthermore, many Chinese companies are operating in the Saudi market
in the fields of infrastructure, construction, and communications, and
employ tens of thousands of Chinese workers. Both countries also agreed to
cooperate in the field of renewable energies, including nuclear energy, and
in the field of aerospace.
Diplomatic relations, led by visits by senior officials and cooperation
agreements, have also risen over the last decade, and most of their
achievements are geared to promote trade and economic relations. Between
2008 and 2013, Chinese officials visited Saudi Arabia twice a year on
average, compared to an average of 2.8 visits per annum by their
counterparts from the United States. Notable in this context were the visit
to Saudi Arabia by China’s President Xi Jinping in January 2016 and the
reciprocal visit to China by Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense
Mohammad bin Salman in September, during which they signed memoranda of
understandings on a series of topics and announced the deepening of the
bilateral security dialogue. In this context, a five-year security
cooperation contract was signed on November 6, 2016, focusing on joint
security training between Saudi Arabia and China.
Thus far, security relations have focused primarily on weapons sales from
China to Saudi Arabia, particularly systems that other suppliers refused to
sell to Saudi Arabia, inter alia, due to the restrictions of
nonproliferation regimes and pressure from Israel. Notable in this context
are the sale of dozens of CSS-2 and DF-3 ballistic missiles in 1988, the
sale of DF-21 ballistic missiles in 2007, and in the last years, perhaps
even cruise missiles, and highly likely, reconnaissance and attack UAVs,
which Saudi Arabia apparently employs in the fighting in Yemen.
Nevertheless, overall, Chinese security exports to Saudi Arabia constitute
merely a niche, since over the years, Saudi Arabia acquired most weapons
from the West (mainly from the United States and the United Kingdom), while
imports from China were only marginal in volume, though qualitative
strategically.
Saudi Arabia understands that currently there is no substitute for the
American military presence in the Gulf to curb Iranian encroachment, but it
is not interested in finding itself, overall, becoming completely dependent
on the United States, particularly as the image of the United States as a
stable pillar for security was damaged during the Obama years. The
disagreements with the United States were exacerbated as a result of the
administration’s policy toward Egypt, its siding with the Muslim
Brotherhood, its weakness vis-à-vis Assad’s regime and Putin’s moves in
general, and in Syria in particular, and the nuclear agreement signed with
Iran, which the Saudis see as a highly negative development.
These tensions pushed Saudi Arabia to attempt to improve its relations with
various countries as much as possible, including China, and perhaps this,
inter alia, served to signal to the new administration that the relations
between the countries must be restored to the status quo ante. The recent
military exercises enabled both Saudi Arabia and China to gradually improve
their military ties on “soft” issues (e.g., combatting terrorism), as a
supplementary layer to their mutually beneficial economic relations, and
serve their mutual political and strategic interests. For China, the
military exercises constitute another cautious measure toward promoting
relations and interests both in mainland China and beyond its borders, at a
very low risk level. It is possible on the basis of the current military
cooperation to build relations with the top Saudi security officials, and in
particular, Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who potentially could reach the
throne in the coming years.
Nonetheless, China cannot and is not interested in supplanting the United
States as the strategic security guarantor of the kingdom’s safety and of
regional stability, shouldering the burden this entails. The scope of the
United States military presence and its ability to project power, coupled
with the quality of its weapon systems, the depth of its military and
political relations, and its interoperability with allied militaries, are
beyond China’s competitive capabilities, at least in the near and medium
range.
Against this background, and coupled with the rapid development of the
Israel-China trade relations on the one hand, and the wider spheres of
common interests between Israel and Saudi Arabia on the other, there may be
potential to promote common topics of interest in the China-Saudi
Arabia-Israel triangle as long as they are of low visibility and of
sufficient deniability. Considering that China has proven advantages in
developing economic infrastructure, while Saudi Arabia can and wants to have
an economic-strategic impact on the region, Israel would do well to continue
striving to tap the potential in the partnership between them to stabilize
its strategic environment, with an emphasis on those countries that are at
peace with Israel – Egypt and Jordan as well as the Palestinian arena.
Israel should likewise continue monitoring the development of relations
between China and Saudi Arabia in the security dimension (visits,
agreements, military exercises, delegations and, in the future, possibly
military bases and the presence of forces in the region), and monitoring the
regional implications. First and foremost, Israel should monitor
nuclear-related developments and the arrival of special weapon systems,
particularly missiles (surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, anti-ship) and
UAVs, which could affect the military balance in the region and Israel’s
qualitative and quantitative edges. Furthermore, as the Saudi regime is
analyzing ways to promote its national strength by establishing indigenous
industries, it would be advisable to monitor the growth of China-assisted
military industries in the kingdom, as a possible source of potential
threats in the region. These are issues that should be discussed between the
defense establishments in Israel and the United States, as well as between
the Israeli government and the Chinese government and, if possible, between
Israel and Saudi representatives.
Source: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=72099
