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On the fundamental problem for set theory (like cladistics and computer science)
Set theory occurs in two varieties: naive and axiomatic - the former applied as “cladistics” and the latter as “computer science”. The former illustrates objects with lines, whereas the latter illustrates objects with points.
It means that both cladistics and computer science end in Russell’s paradox (as Bertrand Russell demonstrated in 1901): cladistics in the form of “a true tree of life” and computer science in the form of the question “does NP equal P”?
Cladistics is thus fundamentally contradictory (ie, paradoxically contradictory), whereas computer science wonders if reality is fundamentally contradictory.
I can explain to them that: no, reality isn’t contradictory. Reality just appears contradictory when we classify it, because classification is contradictory. If reality had been contradictory, then time would not have been relative to speed in space. Instead, reality just arranges itself in the only possible way to avoid contradiction.
It means that we can only create consistent models of how reality behaves, which computer science also does, meaning that NP does not equal P (and that cladistics thus is fundamentally totally wrong).
What reality is does thus obviously escape explanation - sqeezed as it is between naive and axiomatic set theory. Perhaps the reason is that it isn’t anything but change (as Heracleitos suggested).
(Cladistics thus actually just gets matters up-side-down).
Source: http://menvall.wordpress.com/2014/02/09/on-the-fundamental-problem-for-set-theory-like-cladistics-and-computer-science/
