| Online: | |
| Visits: | |
| Stories: |
| Story Views | |
| Now: | |
| Last Hour: | |
| Last 24 Hours: | |
| Total: | |
=?Windows-1252?Q?Saudi_Arabia=92s_New_Missile_Force?=
Saudi Arabia=92s New Missile Force
INSS Insight No. 520, February 24, 2014
Yiftah Shapir, Yoel Guzansky .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=3D4538&articleid=3D6660
SUMMARY: A recent article in Newsweek reported that =93according to a =
well-placed intelligence source,=94 in 2007 Saudi Arabia began to purchase =
CSS-5 (DF-21) ground-to-ground missiles from China. While similar reports =
appeared in the past, the recently published information is distinguished b=
y =
its confirmation by an official =96 albeit anonymous =96 source, and by the =
revelation that the Americans knew about the Saudi-Chinese deal and were =
involved in it. The report raises many questions about the Saudis=92 =
motivations, the implications of the deal, and the timing of the exposure.
A recent article in Newsweek reported that =93according to a well-placed =
intelligence source,=94 in 2007 Saudi Arabia began to purchase CSS-5 (DF-21=
) =
ground-to-ground missiles from China. While similar reports appeared in the =
past, the recently published information is distinguished by its =
confirmation by an official =96 albeit anonymous =96 source, and by the =
revelation that the Americans knew about the Saudi-Chinese deal and were =
involved in it. The report raises many questions about the Saudis=92 =
motivations, the implications of the deal, and the timing of the exposure.
Denied purchase of ground-to-ground missiles by the United States in the =
1980s, the Saudis, unbeknownst to the United States, purchased about ten =
launchers and several dozen Chinese DF-3A missiles (called CSS-2 by NATO), =
which apparently were customized to carry conventional warheads. The =
missiles were stationed in a number of sites in Saudi Arabia and maintained =
by Chinese technicians. The covert deal led to a crisis in relations betwee=
n =
Riyadh and Washington, particularly because the missiles were originally =
intended to carry nuclear warheads. The crisis ended when Saudi Arabia =
agreed to join the NPT.
The DF-3A missiles were already outdated when the Saudis purchased them, an=
d =
it was only a matter of time until they would seek to replace them or add =
more modern missiles to their arsenal. Moreover, these missiles use liquid =
fuel, are cumbersome to prepare for launching, and have low accuracy. And =
indeed, for several years there have been reports on Saudi expansion of its =
missile arsenal. In 2009, the existence of additional sites suspected of =
belonging to the Saudi missile arsenal was reported. A book by a former CIA =
employee published in 2010 even claimed that in 2003, the Saudis, with the =
knowledge of the United States, purchased advanced ground-to-ground missile=
s =
capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Also in 2010, there were reports that =
the strategic missile arsenal was being upgraded and that a new headquarter=
s =
was dedicated outside of Riyadh for the kingdom=92s Strategic Missile Force=
. =
Already then, doubts surfaced as to whether the Saudis needed the facility =
if they still had the old missiles.
The latest report confirms the previous ones: the Saudis did in fact =
purchase missiles from China, with the knowledge of the United States. =
According to the report, CIA personnel examined the missiles in Saudi Arabi=
a =
in order to confirm that they did not carry nuclear warheads. It may be tha=
t =
the deal was not revealed until now because the Americans examined the =
missiles and were not concerned by what they found or because of a desire t=
o =
avoid embarrassment on both sides. The Americans may also have understood =
that if they were not involved in the process, Saudi Arabia could do withou=
t =
them, as it did in the past, and they preferred to retain control of the =
process.
The Dong Feng 21 missile (East Wind 21) is a two-stage ballistic missile =
that uses solid fuel, which shortens the launch preparation time and makes =
maintenance easier. It has a range of some 1,700 kilometers and can carry a =
load of about 600 kilograms. It is much more accurate than the old DF-3A, =
and its CEP (Circular Error Probable, a measure of accuracy) is estimated a=
t =
about 300-400 meters. Its later models are also equipped with terminal =
guidance, which enables it to hit pinpoint targets (though it is unlikely =
that these later models were exported).
It is possible that the Saudis have purchased other missiles in addition to =
the DF-21, including other models produced in China (such as the DF-11 or =
the DF-15) or Pakistani-made missiles, such as one of the Shaheen series. =
Moreover, the Saudi efforts to acquire long range weapons have extended to =
cruise missiles, and the British reportedly sold the kingdom Storm Shadow =
cruise missiles as part of the Saudi program to upgrade its Tornado jets. =
The missile has a range of some 500 kilometers (and therefore, its export i=
s =
restricted under the Missile Technology Control Regime agreements). An =
unofficial confirmation of the sale of the missile appeared in WikiLeaks =
documents in 2009, and in 2013 it was reported that in contrast to previous =
refusals, the United States had agreed to sell the Saudis SLAM-ER cruise =
missiles.
While the new missiles have a shorter range than their predecessors, they =
have better accuracy. This gives them a greater deterrent value in Saudi =
eyes, even if they have conventional warheads, because of their ability to =
hit government buildings, strategic facilities, and military bases in Iran. =
Does the presence of these missiles significantly change the military =
balance in the region? Not as long as the missiles are armed with =
conventional warheads.
The recent Newsweek report raises new questions as to the kingdom=92s =
intentions in the nuclear realm. Officials in Saudi Arabia, which is in the =
midst of a significant conventional military buildup, have often stated tha=
t =
the kingdom is focusing on a nuclear program to meet the country=92s energy =
needs and reduce its dependence on oil. However, Saudi Arabia has previousl=
y =
examined the military nuclear path, and to this end, has increased its =
cooperation with a number of countries, in particular Pakistan. It has had =
military cooperation with Pakistan for some years, and funded part of its =
nuclear program. In addition, several unusual comments from Riyadh since =
2011 have indicated Saudi Arabia=92s willingness to examine the nuclear pat=
h =
if the international community is unable to Iran from attaining military =
nuclear capability. Because Saudi Arabia lacks an independent knowledge =
infrastructure, if it makes a decision to pursue a nuclear option, it will =
presumably prefer to purchase an off-the-shelf nuclear deterrent.
The Saudis=92 motivation in purchasing the missiles is Iran=92s progress in=
its =
missile program and the growth and improvement in its ground-to-ground =
missile arsenal. It is possible that the progress in the Iranian nuclear =
program will lead to increased Saudi pressure on Pakistan to provide the =
kingdom with some type of nuclear guarantees, whether through extended =
deterrence, the stationing of nuclear forces in Saudi Arabia, or transfer o=
f =
nuclear warheads to the Saudis for installation on the new missiles (in a =
regulated move or by turning a blind eye).
Not only have Saudi Arabia=92s concerns not been mitigated by the interim =
agreement signed with the Islamic Republic; they have actually intensified, =
if only because of the agreement=92s significance for Iran=92s internationa=
l and =
regional status. The Saudis are anxious about the Iranian buildup, and it =
may be that the =93revelations=94 on its missile arsenal are part of an att=
empt =
by Saudi Arabia to make its fears public. Furthermore, the report on the =
American involvement comes in advance of an expected visit by President =
Obama to the kingdom, which inter alia is designed to assuage Saudi fears =
that current American policy endangers Saudi security interests.
In recent years, the discussion on strategic issues inside and outside the =
kingdom has become more public, and therefore, it is likely that further =
=93revelations=94 can be expected. This is due to the negotiations with Ira=
n and =
the significance Riyadh attributes to deterrent signals of this kind. The =
deal itself is also significant, indicating China=92s growing interest in =
selling advanced weaponry to the region (and to Saudi Arabia, China=92s =
largest oil supplier), but perhaps also the weakness of America=92s standin=
g =
in the region.
To date there is no solid evidence that Saudi Arabia intends to pursue the =
nuclear rout, even though nuclear weapons in Iranian hands would be a grave =
threat to the kingdom. However, in light of its great wealth and relative =
military weakness, Saudi Arabia will likely seek to construct security =
arrangements that will lend it more independence in decision making and =
better chances of maintaining a stable balance of deterrence in the Gulf =
over time. This is because of the tension in relations with the United =
States and the fear that it will reduce its involvement in the region after =
improving its relations with Iran, which would once again turn Iran into th=
e =
dominant power in the Gulf.
It is not clear whether Israel has received any guarantees from the United =
States (perhaps even from Saudi Arabia) about the deals in question. Israel=
, =
as a rule, does not favor equipping an Arab state with advanced weapons tha=
t =
are capable of threatening it too. In the past, Israel actively opposed any =
such buildup. However, in recent years, given the joint Iranian threat, =
Israel has preferred to turn a blind eye to Saudi Arabia=92s military build=
up =
(and that of the other Gulf states), which has even been perceived in =
Jerusalem as an advantage. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia=92s arming itself wit=
h =
modern ballistic missiles should worry Israel. In addition to the fact that =
these weapons in the hands of a state hostile to Israel, the buildup, =
particularly the silence surrounding it, and the nature of US involvement, =
bode ill for the stability of the region and the struggle against missile =
proliferation.
________________________________________
IMRA – Independent Media Review and Analysis
Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on A=
rab-Israeli relations
Website: www.imra.org.il
For free regular subscription:
Subscribe at no charge: [email protected]
Unsubscribe: [email protected]
For free daily digest subscription:
Subscribe at no charge: [email protected]
Unsubscribe: [email protected]
IMRA is now also on Twitter
http://twitter.com/IMRA_UPDATES
Source: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=63289
