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Can the Palestinians Mobilize the Arab World on the U.S. Embassy Issue?
Can the Palestinians Mobilize the Arab World on the U.S. Embassy Issue?
Pinhas Inbari, January 31, 2017
Jerusalem Issue Briefs Vol. 17, No. 3
Institute for Contemporary Affairs
Founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation
http://jcpa.org/article/palestinian-reactions-u-s-embassy-move-jerusalem/
- The intention of U.S. President Donald Trump to move the American Embassy
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem evoked angry reactions in the Palestinian
Authority which is preparing to block the initiative.
– Arab reaction to the embassy move depends on both Palestinian pressure and
whether or not the Trump administration intends to follow through with his
election promise to move the embassy.
– Jerusalem is very important to the Palestinian Authority and the Muslim
Brotherhood and is less important to other Arab countries and Saudi Arabia
in particular.
– Husam Zomlut, strategic affairs advisor to PA President Abbas and
Palestinian ambassador-designate to Washington, admitted to Hamas TV that
the aim of Palestinian diplomacy is to side-line the United States from its
role in leading the peace process in favor of Europe and the UN.
The intention of President Donald Trump to move the American Embassy from
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem evoked angry reactions in the Palestinian Authority
that is preparing to block the initiative. It is important to note that up
until now the Arab world has kept silent on the issue of embassy, with the
exception of Kuwait. No Arab country has issued official condemnation of the
possibility of the American Embassy transferring to Jerusalem.1 King
Abdullah of Jordan warned Members of Congress of negative consequences of
moving the embassy while visiting Washington on January 31, 2017.2
This does not mean that the Arab countries will continue to stay silent in
the future. Their reactions depend on both Palestinian pressure and whether
or not the Trump administration intends to follow through with his election
promise to move the embassy.3
General Secretary of PLO Executive Committee, Saeb Erekat, in an interview
to Palestinian Television,4 furiously explained why the Palestinian
Authority so strongly objected to the idea. He emphasized that the
Palestinians reject not only the relocating of the embassy to west
Jerusalem, under Israeli control since 1949, but to any part of Jerusalem at
all. This means that the Palestinians stick to their old notion that the
Jews have no place in Jerusalem, no matter where. Dr. Erekat continued that
the move would damage Palestinians because it would annul the latest UN
Security Council Resolution 2334, which defined east Jerusalem as occupied
territory.
Palestinians Threaten Violence
Moving the embassy even to west Jerusalem, Erekat claimed, is an act of
approving the Judaization of Jerusalem. One can deduce from this explanation
that as far as the Palestinians are concerned, east and west Jerusalem are
all the same; all of it is Palestinian, and Jerusalem cannot be recognised
as Jewish in any part. The annulling of resolution 2334 would inflict huge
damage to the Palestinian cause, according to Erekat, because it would
undermine the foundations of Palestinian international legitimacy which the
entire Palestinian diplomacy is based on. Palestinian diplomacy is directed
at shaming Israel at the UN agencies and issuing condemnations in the
international arena. In this regard, the linkage of Judaism to Jerusalem in
any way contradicts international legitimacy, according to the Palestinian
Authority. This was the essence of October 13, 2016, UNESCO resolution that
made no reference to any link of Judaism to the Temple Mount and the Western
Wall.
Palestinian officials have also levelled thinly veiled threats about violent
reactions to the embassy move. If the move occurs, warned a Palestinian
senior official, the PLO would take “crucial decisions,” including the
cancellation of the PLO recognition of Israel. He referenced the visit of
Ariel Sharon in 2000 to the Temple Mount which the PLO blamed for generating
five years of intifada. He also mentioned the recent “provocations” of the
Likud ministers visiting the Temple Mount which “caused” the “knife
intifada.” He threatened Israel with a new wave of violence. Oddly enough,
losing Palestinian Authority rule and security control over areas of the
West Bank were considered to be major security threats towards Israel; yet
the Palestinian Authority is the one levelling threats of violence. In any
case, as far as Jerusalem is concerned, in Palestinian eyes, it is a
“win-lose” situation, with no room for a “win-win” compromise.
The PA official also directed severe threats towards the United States. He
“predicted a windstorm” that would sweep the Arab and Muslim world, hurting
U.S. interests. He elaborated the actions that the PA would take to mobilize
the Muslim world against the expected move of the president. He stated that
the Palestinian flag-raising ceremony in the Vatican on January 14, 2017,
was part of its campaign to thwart off the move.
Erekat also explained why this issue is so crucial for the Palestinians, and
linked it with the preparatory meetings in Beirut to convene the Palestinian
National Council, the PLO Parliament in exile.5
According to Erekat, the collapse of Sykes-Picot Agreement which drew
borders in the Middle East 100 years ago will determine the fate of
Palestine, too, because new boundaries are sure to be drawn. If Palestine
will not be on the map now, it will not be at all. In order to realize the
existence of Palestine in the forthcoming regional arrangements, Palestinian
unity must exist at all costs. In order to overcome divisions, the
Palestinians must re-configure a new PLO Executive Committee that would be
declared as the government-in-exile and the Palestinian National Council
(PNC) as the Parliament of Palestine (and not the elected Palestinian
Legislative Council that is controlled by Hamas). The loss of Jerusalem, at
this critical moment, would be a blow to the realization of a Palestinian
state in the post Sykes-Picot era, explained Erekat.
Arab Position on Jerusalem
All of these threats sound intimidating and serious, but the influential
editor of daily Rai al-Yom, Abd al-Bari Atwan, a Palestinian based in
London, didn’t take them seriously and described them as hollow.6 In an
editorial, he stated that Abu Mazen would never jeopardize the existence of
the Palestinian Authority which he heads, and he has already looked the
other way on other serious matters. One hundred and fifty families of the
top PA bureaucrats rely on the salaries he is paying them. Abu Mazen cannot
tell his underlings to organize and participate in protests against moving
the embassy lest the demonstrations turn against him.
To examine Atwan’s claims, we have to analyse the Arab positions towards
Jerusalem, and here we can find profound disagreements. First, there’s a
disagreement within the Palestinian Authority itself. Erekat said in an
interview that “with all respect to the Arab capitals, Jerusalem is more
important than all the capitals combined.” It is hard to believe that any
Arab country would take this insult to its proud capital easily. This
Palestinian approach can be understood as an aspiration not only to confirm
their existence in the post-Sykes-Picot era but to use Jerusalem/al Quds to
establish themselves as a regional power. Through intimidation and a threat
to use the artificial crisis over the al Aqsa Mosque as a symbol, they seek
to threaten neighbours all around and even exploit the large Palestinian
communities in Israel and Jordan to destabilize both countries. The
aspiration of the Palestinians to secure sole rule over Jerusalem suggests
they will not be satisfied as an ordinary peace-loving state, but only as a
regional power casting a shadow at least over Jordan.
As a matter of fact, it was reported that Jordan asked the Palestinians to
avoid the language of threats and apply back-channel quiet diplomacy.7
Augmenting the importance of Jerusalem may play on the nerves of Saudi
Arabia as well, especially since the Saudis are anxious to preserve the
supreme holy status of Mecca on the background of the Shiite-Sunnite split
and the targeting of Mecca by Shiite missiles from the Yemen.8
Actually, Jerusalem is very important to the Palestinian Authority and the
Muslim Brotherhood and is less important to other Arab countries and Saudi
Arabia in particular, since the status of Mecca is now challenged by the
Shia. The Saudis cannot tolerate a rivalry posed by Jerusalem.
At this point, even Hamas and other Muslim Brotherhood affiliates did not
endorse the alarm cry of Ramallah. The Muslim Brotherhood’s organ in Amman,
a-Sabeel, emphasized the threat to Mecca rather than to Jerusalem.9 Until
last weekend, the only report on the issue was that President Trump
supposedly notified Abu Mazen about his determination to move the embassy,
but a-Sabeel gave no comment on the report.10 However, Hamas TV dedicated a
program to the issue in which they issued threats and intimidations.11 At
the same time, the Hamas TV program did not present a particular Hamas
position, but rather the opinions of several PLO groups. A Hamas participant
in the talk show suggested to wait and see whether Trump would indeed move
the embassy. It was the Fatah representative, Fayez Kawasmeh, who threatened
to launch a popular intifada.
As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, a very large allowance of $500 million
for Jerusalem was pledged at the Serte Summit in Libya around 10 years ago.
The funds were never transferred to the Palestinian coffers because Saudi
Arabia blocked the transmission of the funds.12
Terrorist Salafist movements, such as the Islamic State, have not yet
expressed any reference to Jerusalem. Even leaflets circulated in east
Jerusalem, which explicitly targeted Christians, mentioned not a word on
Jerusalem or the importance of Al-Aqsa.
On January 8, 2017, the terror truck attack by an ISIS sympathizer in
Jerusalem was not formally endorsed by ISIS. Hamas stepped into the vacuum
in order to take credit for an operation that did not belong to them.13
A Shift in Alliances?
We recently received from Palestinian sources, a report about what happened
in a meeting between Abbas and King Salman at their December 21, 2016,
meeting. According to this report, while the two were sitting in the king’s
palace in Riyadh, a telephone call from President Sisi of Egypt was received
to update the king that he had decided, while Mahmoud Abbas was in the king’s
presence, to withdraw the Egyptian Security Council resolution against
Israel. [It was submitted later by other Security Council members.] The King
told Sisi, “Go ahead.” Abu Mazen said, “At least resist Trump’s decision to
move the embassy to Jerusalem,” but Sisi said, according to the sources, “I
am with Trump,” while the King of Saudi Arabia kept silent.
Saeb Erekat claims that Europe is also against the embassy move and that the
Palestinians would mobilize Europe to their side. Considering the reported
talk between Sisi and Abbas, we can analyse that in future, there are
possible differences that might arise with the Trump administration and the
current governments of Europe, while Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia will be
on the U.S. side, and the PA will be on the European side.
Indeed, Husam Zomlut, strategic affairs advisor to PA President Abbas and
Palestinian ambassador-designate to Washington, admitted to Hamas TV that
the aim of Palestinian diplomacy is to side-line the Americans from a
leading peace process role in favor of Europe and the UN.14
Jordan’s Role on Jerusalem
As for Jordan, they have changed their positions over time. After the 1948
war, Jordan annexed the Old City of Jerusalem and West Bank. All Arab
countries rejected this annexation and stuck to the UN decision that
Jerusalem is an international city.15 At the same time, one has to remember
that the planned international zone of Jerusalem is much larger than the
boundaries of the city and engulfs large territory that includes Bethlehem
that UNESCO already recognised as part of the PA.
When Jordan announced the disengagement from the West Bank, it specifically
retained its ties to east Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa mosque, in particular.
The 1994 peace treaty with Israel was based on the status quo agreed upon
after 1967 war, in which Israel is responsible for the security of the
mosques, while the Jordanian Waqf is responsible for administration of the
Temple Mount plaza. The mosques’ plaza is fully Islamic, while the Western
Wall is fully Jewish. Jews and Christians can go to mosques as visitors, but
not as worshippers. Israel promised to give Jordan a preferential status on
the Temple Mount plaza in the permanent agreements.
Although the peace agreement with Jordan deals only with the Temple Mount,
Jordan nominated itself as the guardian of other issues, such as the Arabs
in east Jerusalem. Jordan floods Israel with complaints and requests in
matters of concerning east Jerusalem. Residents of east Jerusalem, outside
the mosques, explained their activity as part of the campaign to block the
Judaization of Jerusalem.16
This situation changed completely after two Jordanian officials were
expelled out of the mosque in disgrace by a violent Palestinian mob in May
2015.17
A furious King Abdullah summoned the representatives of east Jerusalem and
informed the Palestinians that Jordan from now on considers itself
responsible only for the mosques, and disengages itself of all other matters
related to east Jerusalem.19
The Al-Aqsa mosque is crucial to the Hashemite dynasty that sees itself as
the protector of the holy sites. Until the Palestinian Authority joined
UNESCO, Jordan did not operate against Israel. However, the Palestinians,
upon their joining, brought with them a frenzied push and forced Jordan to
compete with them on loyalty to Jerusalem, as seen in the recent UNESCO
decision.
Jordan foresaw this eventuality and forced the Palestinian Authority to sign
an agreement that left in Jordan’s hands the representation of Jerusalem in
UNESCO, but as we saw in the last UNESCO decision, the Palestinians did not
respect the agreement and took charge of the initiative, dragging Jordan
after them.
Basically, as far as Jordan is concerned, if left alone, they would be
satisfied with preserving their status at the mosques, with no interest to
act against the moving of the embassy, as long as it is located in west
Jerusalem.
Historically, both Jordan and Israel provoked the internalization decisions:
in the aftermath of 1948, Israel declared the west side of Jerusalem as its
capital, while Jordan annexed the east side.20 On the issue of
internationalization, Jordan expressed “strong rejection,” but if there was
no other way, internationalization should apply to both parts of Jerusalem –
east and west.
After the 1967 war, Jordan updated its policy to be more “realistic that
[Jerusalem] can be solved peacefully,” avoiding the threat of becoming a
religious dispute and keeping it “political.”
After 1967, King Hussein referenced Jerusalem as the “City of Allah”21 which
can be interpreted as a version of internalization. However, he meant the
Old City and “the Holy Basin” not Jerusalem as a whole.
Given its sensitivities, Jordan will try and convince the Trump
administration to avoid moving the embassy, but it is less due to its own
interests, but rather because of competition forced on them by the
Palestinians. Indeed, the daily Al-Rai Al-Yom reported that Jordan has been
operating in secret channels to persuade the Trump administration not to
move the embassy to Jerusalem.22
Jordan’s position towards a solution in Jerusalem doesn’t deviate from its
main positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict before 1967. Pre-1967, the
Arab-Israeli conflict presented an existential crisis for the Jordanians, in
which Jordan did not recognize Israel. After 1967, the conflict switched
from being an existential conflict to a political one.
Pre-1967, Jordan was strongly against the internationalization of Jerusalem,
and that position hasn’t changed over the years. According to Palestinian
sources, in a recent conversation between Abbas and King Abdullah, King
Abdullah promised Abbas that he would bring up the issue of the Jerusalem
embassy with Trump, but that Jordan has many issues that are more pressing
to raise with Trump. The Jerusalem issue cannot be at the top of the
priority list, the King explained. Abbas requested that the King intercede
on his behalf, but the King responded that he wasn’t sure of his position
vis-à-vis Trump.
* * *
Notes
1 According to this Reuter‘s report all Arab sources spoke anonymously,
except for Kuwait. http://www.rense.com/general30/sdje.htm
2
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/moving-us-embassy-jerusalem-will-impact-regional-stability%E2%80%99
3 Al-Monitor raised doubts about Israeli preference on moving the embassy,
preferring free hand in construction in east Jerusalem instead.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/israel-palestinians-us-donald-trump-embassy-jerusalem.html
but we have to keep in mind that the author of this article is Uri Savir, a
shareholder in the Oslo agreement who is keen to preserve the principles of
this agreement intact.
4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=voy17Tdnfdo
5 http://alresalah.ps/ar/post/153935/تفعيل-الوطني-يصطدم-بمواقف-فتح-السياسية
http://alresalah.ps/ar/post/153885/تحضيرية-الوطني-رفع-عتب-وفرار-من-مسؤولية-الفشل!
6http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=600071
7 http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=599535
8 For example, http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=522818
9
http://assabeel.net/islam/item/210765 -بالفيديو-تعرف-على-سبب-منع-الطائرات-المرور-فوق-الكعبة
10
http://assabeel.net/فلسطين/item/210894-مقرب-من-ترامب-يبلغ-عباس-بنقل-السفارة-للقدس-بعد-20-الشهر
11 https://youtu.be/gjJ5Kw2UQ_A
12 http://jcpa.org/article/the-muslim-schism-over-jerusalem/
http://israelagainstterror.blogspot.co.il/2015/09/the-muslim-schism-over-jerusalem-pinhas.html
13 https://youtu.be/Ni_E5RKHi0w
14 https://youtu.be/gjJ5Kw2UQ_A
15
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/10/30/jerusalem-statusinternationalregime.html
16
http://www.rcja.org.jo/page/%D8%A3%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA+%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF+%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3/58/%E2%80%AA/page/%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA+%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF+%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3/63/%E2%80%AC
17 Video.
http://www.albawaba.com/loop/watch-moment-jordanian-imam-gets-kicked-out-aqsa%E2%80%A6-palestinians-699102
18 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FqbvRXqxw9o
19 https://youtu.be/x-uDsACwSM8
20 In this formal site one can find the policy and attitudes of Jordan
towards Jerusalem.
http://www.rcja.org.jo/page/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A4%D9%8A%D8%A9+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9+%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%A9+%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3/26/
On the issue of internationalization Jordan expressed “strong rejection,”
but if there is no other way, but internationalization, it should apply to
both parts – east and west. But, after 1967 war Jordan updated its policy to
“realistic that can be solved peacefully” that avoid the threat of become
religious dispute, but political.”
21 http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/views_jerusalem2.html
22 http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=599535
——————————-
About Pinhas Inbari
Pinhas Inbari is a veteran Arab affairs correspondent who formerly reported
for Israel Radio and Al Hamishmar newspaper, and currently serves as an
analyst for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
Source: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=72122
