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On the battle between nominalism (eg, empirical science) and realism (eg, cladistics and particle physics)
The fundamental problem with conceptualization is that it opens an empty middle (ie, Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation) by that not both things and classes can be real at the same time, because the difference between them is that one is real and the other abstract. If both of them could be real at the same time, then there wouldn’t be any difference between them.
This problem did early on give rise to the fundamental two lines of logical reasoning: 1. Nominalism, assuming that things are real (eg, traditional empirical science), and 2. Realism, assuming that classes are real (eg, cladistics and particle physics), which thus are totally different, actually orthogonal (ie, diametrically opposed). This divergence split humanity into three groups: 1. Nominalists, 2. Realists and 3. logically inconsistent.
These three groups do, however, ultimately meet in Russell’s paradox, ie, the empty middle, but comprehending it differently: 1. Nominalists comprehending it as a paradox, 2, Realists comprehending it as The Truth, and logically inconsistent don’t knowing which leg to stand on.
The fundamental problem with this empty middle is thus whether it is real or not, ie, whether paradoxes are real or not. Quantum mechanics solved this problem by revealing that the empty middle is a matter of probability rather than of a thing (like The Truth) by Niels Bohr in a famous battle with Albert Einstein, thereby also revealing that 1. Nominalism is the correct approach. This revelation did thus falsify 2. Realism in a generic sense, that is, both cladistics and particle physics before they emerged. Neither cladists nor particle physicists thus understand quantum mechanics. Concerning cladists, this ignorance is not surprising, but concerning particle physicists it is. In the latter case it may be explained by that the discipline mainly is populated with practitioners that can be classified as extremist empirical scientists (or realist nominalists), ie, empirical scientists denying the difference between 1. Nominalism and 2. Realism, that is, the difference between thing and class. This stupidity is thus just a vain attempt to avoid 1. Nominalism (and thus also quantum mechanics) just like Albert Einstein tried to avoid it. It means that if particle physicists indeed have found the so-called “Higgs particle”, then they have actually eradicated conceptualization by equalizing thing with class. We can thus be very sure that they haven’t.
Instead, the explanation of the empty middle is thus that it is a matter of probability rather than of a thing as revealed by quantum mechanics. The mathematics around this matter is also already in place. What remains is to finally get rid of cladistics and particle physics, and continue exploring the route of quantum mechanics (in a true nominalistic spirit).
Another contribution to understanding of conceptualization http://menvall.wordpress.com/
Source: https://menvall.wordpress.com/2015/02/25/on-the-battle-between-nominalism-eg-empirical-science-and-realism-eg-cladistics-and-particle-physics/
